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 1. ABBREVIATIONS 
AAPV  :  AbhisamayalaThkaralokii  Prajnaparamiteivyakhyd of  Harib-
          hadra. 
BCAP  :  Bodhicaryilvatarapaijikei of  Prajriakaramati, ed. by P. L. 
         Vaidya, BST, No. 12. 
BhK :  Bhavanakrama of  Kamalagila, Minor Buddhist Texts part I 
         & II, ed. by G. Tucci 1798 Rinsen Book Company Kyoto.
BhK II  :  Bkeivanakrarna, ch. II. P. Vol. 102, D. No. 3916. 
BhK III : Third  Bhavanalerama. Minor Buddhist Texts, part III., SOR 
         XLIII, Roma 1971. 
 Bibl.  Bud.  : Bibliotheca Buddhica. 
 Bibl.  Ind.  : Biblitheca  Indica. 
BST : Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga. 
C : The Co ne edition, U. S. A., IASWR. 
D : The sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, 
         University of Tokyo, ed. by Hayashima, Takasaki, Yamagu-
         chi, and Ejima. 
HOS : HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES, ed by Daniel H. H. 
          Ingalls. 
JIBS : Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyo-
         gaku  Kenkyu), Tokyo. 
LAS :  Lankiivatara-Sutra,  ed. by Bunyu Nanjo. 
MAK :  Madhyamakiilakkeira-keirika of  Santaraksita (P. No. 5258. 
         Vol. 101.  Sa48b7-52b' D. No. 3884.  Sa53a1-56133). 
 Mal :  Madhyamakalokantima of  Kamalagila (P. No. 5287. Vol. 
         101. Sa 143b2-275a4 D. No. 3887. Sa133b4-244a7). 
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MAP :  Madhyamakalarkkdra-paiijikii of  Kamalagila (P. No. 5287. 
          Vol. 101. Sa 84b7-143b2 D. No. 3887.  Sa84a1-133b4). 
MAV  :  Madhyamakdlainkara-vrtti of•a .'ntaraksita (P. No. 5285. 
          Vol. 101.  Sa  52b'-84b7 D. No. 3885. Sa56b4-84a'). 
MK  :  Madhyamaka-kdrikcis de  Nagarjuna avec  la  Prasannapadd 
         commentaire de  Candrakirti, pub. par Louis de la  Vallee 
         Poussin, Bibl. Bud. IV. 1903-1913. 
MMK :  Mitlamadhyamaka-karika- of  Ndgarjuna, Bibl. Bud. IV. 
N : The  sNar-than edition, preserved at Kyoto University and 
          Toyobunko. 
NB :  Nyiiyabindu of Dharmakirti. 
om : The edition omits the letter or the word. 
P : The Peking edition ed. by Daisetz Suzuki. 
PV  :  Prama-  navartika-karika of  Dharmakirti. 
SDK :  Satyadvayavibhaitga-karikii of  Jrianagarbha, (D. No. 3881 
         Sa 1b1-3b3). 
SD NS  :  Sarvadharmanilzsvabhcivasiddhi of  Kamalagila (P. No. 5289. 
         Vol. 101. Sa 312a4-338a5 D. No. 3889. Sa 273a4-291a7 N. No.
         3280.  Sa301a6-323a4 C. Tanju Vol. 28 (Sa) ff 269a5-288a7). 
SD NS (1) (2) : Seitetsu Moriyama, Translation and Tibetan Text of the 
         Sarvadharmanqisvabhavasiddhi of  Kamalagila, Memoirs of 
         the Postgraduate Research Institute Bukkyo University. No. 
        9. (1981) pp. 60-100. No. 10. (1982) pp. 109-158. 
SDP :  Satyadvayavibhanga-paiijika ofa .-ntaraksita, (D. No. 3883. 
         P. No. 5283). 
SDV  :  Satyadvayavibhaitga-vrtti of  Jrianagarbha, (D. No. 3882) . 
 S  OR : Serie Orientale Roma. 
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TS,  TSP  :  Tattvasaitgraha of  gantaraksita with the Commentary  'Pan-
         jikil" of  Kamala§ila,  ed. by S. D. Shastri, Bauddha Bharati 
 Series-1, Varanasi,  1968. 
TSWS : Tibetan Sanskrit Works  Series. 
V : AAPV, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 4. 
 Vg :  vik§atika  (karika) of Vasubandhu, ed. by Levi. 
W : AAPV, ed. by U. Wogihara. 
WZKSO : Wiener Zeitschrift  far die Kunde  Siid-und Ostasiens. 
                 2. INTRODUCTION 
 § 1.  KAMALASILA'S AND HARIBHADRA'S PHILOSOPHICAL 
     POINT OF VIEW. 
 Buddhist epistemological theory, which was formalized by Dignaga 
                  (1) 
(circa A. D. 480-540) and significantly advanced by Dharmakirti (c. A. 
        (2) 
D. 600-660), is closely related to Buddhist logic. Some scholars have 
                                          (3) 
therefore called this the school of Buddhist logicians.gantaraksita (c. 
(1) Concerning this date see Massaki Hattori. Dignaga, On Perception, being 
 the  Pratyaksapariccheda of  Dignaga's  Pramii  wtsamuccaya from the Sanskrit 
 fragments and the Tibetan versions, HOS. 47. (1967), EDITOR'S FOREWORD. 
  p. V. 
(2) Concerning this date see E. Frawallner. LANDMARKS IN THE  HISTO-
 RY OF INDIAN LOGIC, WZKSO, Band V. (1961) p. 137. However, D. 
 Malvania places the time of Dharmakirti somewhere between 550-600 A. D. 
  (Durveka  Migra's Dharmottarapradipa, TSWS, Vol. II. Patna 1955). Introduction 
 p. XVI.  While S. Chandra Vidyabhusana places his date about 635-650 A. D. 
 (A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC, 1978, p. 303.). 
(3) Matsumoto  Shiro kk*,01. 
 Bukkyo Ronrigakuha no Nitai Setsu  (Jo)  (J)  (Contro-
  versies on the Theory of Twofold Truth (Satyadvaya) between Buddhist logici-
  ans (1)). Nanto  Bukkyo or Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies 
  mmi,gt Dec. (1980) No. 45, p. 101. 
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  (4) (4) A
. D. 725-788), his disciple  Kamalagila (c. A. D. 740-795) and Harib-
hadra hadra (c. A. D. 800 are now known as the major philosophers of the 
Yogacara-madhyamika school. They were not only greatly influenced 
by Buddhist logic, but they also tried to apply it to prove that all 
things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (niltsvabheiva) . 
 During their period the Buddhist philosophical systems , such as those 
of the  Vaibhasika,  Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamika , had already 
arrived at their highest point, and at the same time , Buddhist logic 
was also flourishing. In these circumstances , even within Buddhists 
schools themselves, heated debates were common . Thus the formalism 
developed by  Dignaga and then Dharmakirti for judging the validity of 
a proposition 
   the two valid means of cognition  (pramiina) by direct perception 
                                (6)    (
pratyaksa) and inference  (anumdna) was employed in deciding 
   such theoretical disputes by the major philosophers of the Yogaca-
   ra-madhyamika school. 
 Oki Kazufumi 
 Musoyuishiki to Usoyuishiki  fillifkVirea (The theory of the  Satakara 
 and  Alikakara-vadin).  Icon.  Daijo Bukkyo No. 8  Yuishikishish MI • tAllAft 
 8  tiftsigty, ed. by A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama, J. Takasaki, p. 179  (Shunju sha 
 WX*±, 1983). 
(4) Concerning these dates see Katsumi Mimaki, BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA' . 
 ZINBUN KAGAKU KENKYUSYO, UNVERSITE DE KYOTO (1982). 
 INTRODUCTION, p. 5. 
(5) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama  Chagan  Shish no 
 Rekishi to Bunken  ittilEV,0))E5ca (History and Bibliography of Philosophy 
 of  Madhyamika),  Kam.  Daijo Bukkyo No. 7 (Nov. 1982), Chagan  Shish',INPA • 
 kI.L\gz 7  *NEE. p. 21. cf. Note 3. 
(6)  YGichi Kajiyama. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy : An annotated 
 translation of the  Tarkabhasa of  Moksdkaragupta. Memoirs of the Faculty of 
 Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, Introduction p. 2.  kaki Indo Bukkyo no  Ron-
 rigaku, (cf. Note 33) p. 248. 
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 gantaraksita and his followers were therefore in the position to prove 
the proposition that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature  (nilpv-
abhava) through the use of these two valid means of cognition  (pramii-
na). In other words, had this logical procedure been disregarded, the 
proposition that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niitsvabhava) 
could not be shown. In this sense, we can understand them as philoso-
phers of the Yogacara-madhyamika school who were put in a position 
to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niltsvabhava) 
according to the formalism of logical examination. However, even though 
they adopted Buddhist logic to prove their philosophy, this does not 
mean that they endorsed completely the philosophy and logic of Dhar-
makirti, since, in the end, they refute this view from the standpoint of 
highest truth of the  Madhyamika. Their obligation was to prove that 
all things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhava) and, at the same 
time, to show that there are good grounds for refuting the various views 
of the other schools which were influential at the time. Accordingly, it 
was to these purposes that  Kamala§ila wrote his Madhyamakiiloka-nd-
                                               (7) 
ma  (Mal) and Sarvadharmanifisvabhava-siddhi (SD NS) which consist 
of debates between the  Yogacara-madhyamika and other schools of 
Buddhism, the  Vaibhasika, the  Sautrantika, and the Yogacara, on the 
subject of whether or not all things have intrinsic nature  (svabhava). 
  It is obvious that  Kamala§ila's philosophy was greatly influenced by 
 (8) 
his teacher  Santaraksita who wrote such works as the  Madhyamakala-
(7)  SD  NS (1). (2). 
  Seitetsu Moriyama. A Synopsis of the  Sarvadharmanihsvabhavasiddhi of  Kama-
  lasila JIBS Vol. XXX No. 2, Mar. 1982. 
(8)  Yaichi Kajima. Later Madhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation Maha-
  yana Buddhist Meditation : Theory and Practice. ed. by M. Kiyota, (Honolulu : 
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 ikkara-Vdrikii (MAK),  Madhyamakiilainkiira-vrtti (MAV) and  Tattva -
sanigraha (TS), since he wrote the  Madhyamakifikkara-paniika (MAP) 
and  Tattvasalitgraha-paiijikii (TSP) as a commentary on these texts . 
  It is this logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature 
 (nilisvabhilva) and the logical refutation of the views of the other 
schools in portions of Haribhadra's  Abhisamayalankiirdlokii  Prajiiiipei-
ramitilvyakhyd (AAPV) that were written on the bases of  a.ntaraksita's 
MAK and MAV and  Kamala§ila's MAP,  Mal and SDNS, which are 
parallel to Haribhadra's work. 
  It should thus be pointed out that the following translation of Harib -
hadra's  AAPV shares much in common with the MAK,  MAV, MAP, 
and  Mal, which I have indicated in my notes to the translation. 
 § 2.  HARIBHADRA'S  ABHISAMAYALANIKARALOKA  PRAJ&- 
    APARAMITAVYA.KHYA (AAPV) 
 The AAPV was written, of course, as a commentary on the  Asteisa-
hasrikii-prajiiiipdramita, according to the  Abhisamayillainkiira of Maitre -
ya. In this respect the design of the  AAPV differs from such works as 
the MAK and MAV of  Santaraksita, which were written with the 
purpose of demonstrating his own philosophical position as a  Yogacara-
mad hyamika. 
 This is true also for  Kamalagila's commentary (MAP) on  antaraksi -
 University Press of Hawaii, 1978) pp. 114-143 
 Ichigo  Masamichi  --4.E[SEZ.  "Chagan-ShOgonron-chir no Wayakukenkyu  (1)  iNcitjungg
i  a  fp$RF5f,  (1)  (J
apanese tranlation of  MAV).  KyOtosangyOdaiqaku  Ronshii V313gMjc*V-X, 
 vol. 2 ; Jimbunkagaku Keiretsu  )r^f31-*3.(Ulf vol. 1, pp. 182-204. Idem (2), 
 Mikkyogaku  (M(*) 9, pp. 42-55. A Synopsis of the  Madhyamakalatikara of 
 Santarak§ita. JIBS No. XX-2, pp. 995-989. 
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ta's works,  as- well as his  Mal and SD NS, which were also written as 
independent philosophical expostions. However, since Haribhadra is a 
successor to the  Yogacara-madhyamika tradition of  Santaraksita and 
 Kamala§ila, he has inherited much from the previous masters of this 
                                      (9) 
school. This is clearly seen in those portions of the AAPV where 
Haribhadra defines his stance as a Yogacara-madhyamika through his 
logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhciva) 
and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools, (portions of 
the commentary that actually have no direct relation to the  Prajfilipc7ra-
mita  sutra on which he is supposedly commenting), since these logical 
proofs and refutations correspond largely to those of the  MAK and 
MAY of  Santaraksita and  Kamalagila's MAP,  Mal, and his SD NS. Even 
beyond the selections translated below, for example, Haribhadra's refuta-
                               (10) 
tion of the various sorts of causation is the same as that appearing in 
(9) AAPV W pp.  6245-6425 V pp.  45732-4682' 
  These portions appear as a commentary of following sentences from the  Astasa-
  hasrikei  Prajniiparamitii-sutra and verses 27 and 28 of the  Abhisamayiikonkra : 
 (W62322-26  V15416-19) yaiva ca Bhagavato  bodhisattva-bhutasya  tathata saiva 
  Bhagavato'  nuttararit samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhasya  tathata / iyarh  sä 
 tathata  yaya tathataya bodhisattvo  mahasattvo'  nuttardth samyaksambodhim 
 abhisambuddhah sarhs  tathagata iti  namadheyarh labhate / 1. W. om. Tr. by E. 
  Conze  (Bibl.  Ind. No. 284, Calcutta 1958)  p11435-38 hitarh  sukhafn ca  tranarh 
  ca  garavarh  layanaria  nrnam /  parayariarii ca  dviyarh ca  parivayakasariljnakam 
  // 27 //  anabhogarh tribhir  yaniati  phalasaksat  kriyayamakarh  /  pagcinaria 
  gatikaritram  idarh  karitralaksaklam // 28 // c. f. Edward Conze  Abhisamayalan-
  kara introduction and translation from original text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index, 
  SOR VI p. 13 
  cf. P. S. Jaini. 
 Saratama A  parijika on the  Astasahasrika  Prajnaparamitd  sutra by Acarya 
 Ratnakaranti, TSWS No. XVIII p. 4, Kashi prasad jayaswal reserch institute, 
  patna 1979. 
 (10) AAPV W pp.  96926-97618 V pp. 54922-55325 
   Amano Kouei  XTf2;77,3"+r& 
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 (11) 
the  SD  NS. It is then the appearance in  Haribhadra's writings of 
passages found also in the works of5..ntaraksita and  KamalaSila that 
shows his indebtedness to the latter two masters. Thus, in the transla-
tion to follow, I have attempted to indicate those passages which are 
found also in the MAK, MAV, and MAP. Generally speaking, the proof 
that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (naisvabhava) is accompli-
shed through the refutation of the views of various school in the writings 
of  Santaraksita,  KamalaSila, and Haribhadra, and in most cases the 
refutation begins with confuting the views of non-Buddhists and 
Buddhists that the external world is real. 
 In this first case, it is pointed out that atomic theory is the necessary 
basis for asserting that the external world is real. There are then three 
                      (12) 
varieties of atomic theory, those of the  VaiSesika,  Vaibhasika and 
 Sautrantika, which are then refuted in that order. Basically, these 
Yogacara-madhyamikas propose that a real external world cannot be 
proven so long as atomic theory cannot be established. Such atomic 
theories depend on the concept of intrinsic nature  (svabhava) , and by 
logically confuting atomic theory the proposition of things possessing an 
intrinsic nature is destroyed. Such a refutation of atomic theory seems 
to have originated in the  VirhSatikd (Vs) of Vasubandhu, verse XI 
 Ingaron no Ichi Shiryo —Haribhadra no Kaishaku— IZMVO-D—*14--2.  9 
           (One source of causation—interprtation of  Haribhadra). Kanakura 
 Hakase Koki Kinen Indogaku  Bukkycigaku  Ronshii ft1-4±-tfiligEt-_,,,FPALF*11,A* 
 2.(0M (1966) pp. 323-50 P.  S. Jaini, (cf. Note 9) p. 5. 
(11)  SD  NS (2), pp 119-129. 
(12) Mimaki Katsumi "Olt A E,. 
 Shokiyuishiki Shoronzyo ni okeru  Sautrantika setsu viocitagiv/cy;d-z 
 Sautrantika Deux theses philosophiques de 1'  ecole  Sautrantika,  discutees 
 dans les premiers  traites des  Vijilaptivadin du Grand  Vehicule.  Toho Gaku 
 (Eastern Studies) A-?-#.4No. 43, pp. 88-89 Jan 1972 
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               (13) 
and its commentary. 
 The Yogacara-madhyamika then uses this manner of refuting the 
external world to deny the subjective reality  (vijiiiinamiitra) of the 
Yogacara school represented by the  Satyakara and  Alikakara-vadins. 
 3.  KAMALASILA'S AND  HARIBHADRA'S REFUTATION OF 
   THE SATYAKARA AND ALIKAKARA-VADINS 
 I. The characteristics of thesetwo schools 
 We may explain this subject from the following three points of view : 
Their respective view of  C1j image  ((Mara),  [2] self-cognition  (svasa-
givedana) and [3] the three natures  (trisvabheiva). To begin with, it 
is helpful to refer to the explanations given in the  Jiiiiniisdrasamuccaya-
  (14) (15) 
nibandhana of Bodhibhadra (c. A. D.  10C--11C). According to this 
work, the Satyakara-vadin maintains that the images  ((Zara) of  cogni-
(13)  VA pp.  625-72 
 na tad  ekaria na  canekarh  visayab  paramakrugah / na ca  te  sarhhata  yasmat 
 paramarjur na sidhyati  // 11 // 
 Kim  uktarh bhavati / yat tad  riipadikam  ayatanarh  apadivijnaptinarh  pratyekaria 
 visayaki  syat ad  ekath  va  sydd  yathavayaviraparh k lpyate  vaiAesikaih /  anekarh 
 va  paramakrugati /  sarhhata  va  to eva  paramarp_vatr / na  tavad  ekarh visayo 
 bhavaty avayavebhyo'  nyasydvayavirupasya kvacid apy  agrahavat / napy anekarli 
 paramahanarh pratyekam  agraharrat /  napi  te  sarhhata.  visayobhavanti /  yasmat 
 paramahur  ekarh dravyarh na sidhyati  // cf.  Daijo Butten 15  Seshinronja 
 A15  -NUM tr. by Nagao G. Kajiyama Y. Aramaki N. p.361-2  VA Note 16. 
 published by  Chuo  Karon sha 1976. SDNS  (1) p. 63. 
(14) A commentary of  Panasarasamuccaya which was written  1  y Aryadeva (?) 
 Katsumi Mimaki. 
 La refutation bouddhique d  la permanence des choses  (sthirasiddhidasar.ra) et 
 la preuve de la  momentaneite des choses  (ksanabhafigasiddhi). Publications de
 l'Institut de Civilisation I dienne, Fascicule 41, Paris. (1976) pp. 190-207. 
(15) Concerning this date see Katsura Syoryu  la, Dharmakirti ni okeru 
 Jikoninshiki noRiron  #  4  IC  t'Sd-  FOE  Mit.1  3M  rifi  (Dharmakirti's 
 Theory of  Svasconvedana). Nanto  Bukkya or Journal of the Nanto Society for 
 Buddhist Studies  MOIL& No. 23. p. 8 Nov. (1969) 
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on possess a dependent nature  (paratantra-svabhava), while the  Alika-
kara-vad in maintains the images of cognition are imaginary by nature 
 (parikalpita-svabhilva). This explanation suggests to us one way in 
which we might  understand the differences in the theories of the 
 Satyakara and  Alikakara-vadins. 
  I. A. According to the theory of  Satyakara-vadin : 
 [1] Images  (a-kiira) such as the color blue, are real (satya).  However, 
when these images are wrongly interpreted as being either subjective 
or objective, or when they are misunderstood as being either eternal or 
                                    (17) t
emporary, such discriminations are unreal. Nevertheless, images  (akeira) 
themselves are always real and existent. 
 (2)  Independent self-cognition (svasakvedana) apart from images, 
such as the color blue, cannot exist. Self-cognition is none other 
than the very manifestation of images themselves. Therefore, self-
cognition and images cannot be separated from each other , because 
 (18) 
they are identical. 
 (3 Images  (Ctkiira) are inseparable from cognition  (vzjiiiina), which 
has a dependent nature  (paratantra-svabhilva) because it depends upon 
the immediately preceding moment of consciousness (samanantara-
pratyaya). Accordingly images  ((Mara) also possess a  dependent nature 
 (paratantra-svabhiiva). It is the misconceiving of these images, which 
 (16)  Yuichi Kajiyama. 
 Controversy between the  sakara and  nirakara-vadins of the  yogacara school— 
 some materials. JIBS Vol. XIV No. 2 pp. 424-425. Hirakawa Akira  5  Z  )11t . 
 Indo  Bukkyo. shi (Gekan)  4  >' p. 233. 
(17) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3. p. 181, 197, 198. 
(18) MAK. XLVII and MAV cf. Note (205). 
 Mal P200b5  D183111 cf. Note 32. 
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have a dependent nature, as something that may be seperated into an 
external world and internal world, or as things which are eternal or 
temporary, that imparts to these images an imaginary nature  (parikal-
pita-svabhdva). When self-cognition  (svasakvedana) accompanied by 
images, which has a dependent nature  (paratantra-svabhava), is separa-
ted from an imaginary nature  (parikalpita-svabhava), it becomes absolute 
perfection  (parinispanna-svabhava). Therefore, independent self-cogni-
tion  (svasakvedana) which has a dependent nature apart from images 
 (iikara) is impossible. Accordingly images  (iikara) themselves exist as 
a reality even in the self-cogniton of sages. The distinction between 
the direct perception  (pratyak.sa) of an ordinary person and the direct 
perception of sages actually lies in whether or not imaginary thought-
                                                        (19)
constructions (vikalpa) are projected on real images  (satyakiira). 
  I. B. According to the theory of  Alikikara-vidin : 
 (1] Both the images of the perceived and the perceiver  (grallya-graha-
kakara) are unreal (alika), or imaginary. Those images are produced 
                                  (20) 
through dependence on error  (bhriinti), and therefore, they could not 
(19) Katsura Syoryu. ibid Note 15, p. 13. 
(20) AAPV W  63125-6328 V  46220-28 
 (objection  :) A thing whose nature is erroneous  (bhriin  ti) makes an unreal 
  image  (alikiikiira) manifest. Therefore, even though an image  (akara) is non-
  existent (asat), perception  (sarhvedana) would appear due to this error  (bhrlinti). 
  (Answer  :) Your statement is incorrect. What does the word "error  (bhriinti)" 
  mean? Does it imply : 1) a latent impression  (vasand) which produces confusion 
 (vibhrarna) and which remains as a cognition  (jiianct) of a cause  (hetu-bhata); 
  or 2) nothing more than the erroneous cognition  (bhriintam eva  jiiiinam) which 
  remains as a result  (kc7rya) of and produced from such a latent impression 
 (viz"  sand)? Let's examine which one is correct. 1) If the first alternative is 
  maintained, it is illogical (ayukta) that they (viz., images) are perceived through 
  that (latent impression), since its cause (as a latent impression) does not have 
  a necessary connection  (apratibaddhatva) with (those) images  (iikara). Also, 
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be real (satya). 
 (2) Only independent self-cognition  (svasakvedana) which is detached 
from the images of both the perceived and the perceiver is real and 
this means the nondual cognition  (advayafriana). Accordingly both 
images and self-cognition are  independent of each other. In fact, the 
difference between the perception of ordinary people and the  supermu 
                                    (21) 
ndane cognition  (nirvikalpalokottarajiiiina) of sages lies in whether or 
not the images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in their cognition. 
 [3] Both images of the perceived and the perceiver which are based 
 otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow  (atiprasanga). Nor is the 
 necessary connection  (pratibandha) with a causal relation  (tad-utpatti) possible 
 (between images and latent  impression), because otherwise a dependent nature 
 (paratantratva) would follow as before. 2) If, on the other hand, the second 
 alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (pratibandha) between image 
 (iikara)  (and cognition  (vijneina)) is not a causal relation (tadutpatti), but a 
 relation of identity  (tildeitmya). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) 
 are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things 
 (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously should be a causal relation 
 (hetu-phalatva). For this reason, it is hard to avoid the problem that these 
 (images) would come to have a dependent nature (paratantratva), since these 
 (images) are not separate from it  (viz.,  cognition), like error  (bhriintivat). 
 Otherwise what would they be?  Mal  P202b3-6  D185a4-6 
 Ses pa de ni  ji  ltar  myon ba de  ltar gnas pa  yati ma yin  te / gcig  la  griis kyi 
 no bo  nid 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gal  te de ni 'khrul pas de lta bu ges so  ze na / 
 'khrul pa 'di  gan yin / gal  tees pa de  iiid yin na ni / 'o na de  ninon sum 
 sum ma yin  te /  ninon sum gyi mtshan  hid ni ma 'khrul pa yin pa'i phyir  la / 
 de rtag  to bdag  hid la bdag  iiid kho nas 'khrul pa'i phyir ro //  griis kyi bdag 
 Aid du  yan de'i bdag  hid  snail ba'i phyir  griis med pa'i  no bo  iiid  lianas par 
 thal  ba kho na yin  te /  gnus  dan  giiis ma yin pa dag ni phan tshun 'gal ba'i 
 phyir ro // 'khrul pa don g2anyinyafideyatil ran rig pa'i mthar thug pa (2.- -.2)  "'lid 
yin pas des  giiis med pa de  ltar  Ses pa ni ma yin no // 1. D  dan 2. P om. 
 PV. II. 212. 
 paricchedo 'ntar anyo'  yaria  bhago bahir iva  sthitati /  jiianasyabhedino  bheda-
 pratibhaso by  upaplavati  // (See Tosaki Hiromasa =7,E. Bukkyo  Ninshiki-
 ron   no  Kenkyd  (Jokan)  41.41InfardODF .9t,  _EA p. 313.) 
(21) Katsura  ShoryCi. ibid Note 15, p. 13. 
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  on error  (bhranti) have an imaginary nature  (parikalpita-svabhava). 
  When cognition  (vzjiiiina), which depends upon the immediately prece-
  ding moment of consciousness and thus has a dependent nature  (para-
  tantra-svabhava), is seperated from the two images of the perceived and 
  the perceiver which have an imaginary nature  (parikalpita-svabheiva), 
  it becomes absolute perfection  (parin4panna-svabheiva). To put it in 
  another way, self-cognition  (svasainvedana), which is only the operation 
            (22) 
  of perception, is absolutely perfect  (parinispanna-svabhava). The cogni-
  tion of ordinary people is always accompanied by the images of the 
  perceived and the perceiver, which have an imaginary nature. On the 
  other hand, the self-cognition of sages is the nondual cognition  (advaya-
 jiiiina), which is only the operation of perception and is detached from 
  an unreal image, and is absolutely perfect, because it is seperated from 
  the images of the perceived and the perceiver  (grahya-grethakakara), 
  which are imaginary by nature. 
   II. The method of refutation 
 (23) 
    The purpose of  'a-ritaraksita's, Kamalagila's, and Haribhadra's refuta-
  ting the various views of other schools, such as atomic theories of 
 Vai§esika,  Vaibhasika, and  Sautrantika, or the epistemology of  Satyakara 
  and  Alikakara-vadins, is to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic 
  nature  (nihsvabhava). To do this, they begin by refuting the views 
  that admit some intrinsic nature (svabheiva), in other words, they proof 
  that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (nillsvabhava). This 
  method of refutation itself as a proof that all things are devoid of 
  (22) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3, p. 181, 187, 199. 
  (23)  Yilichi Kajiyama. ibid Note 8, pp. 114-143. 
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intrinsic nature, is actually indirect, in the sense that they negate the 
views of other schools. This negation proceeds by dividing the various 
views that admit some intrinsic nature  (svabheiva) into classes of 
        (24) 
alternatives and refuting them in order. This leads to the Madhyamika 
(24)  Mal P198a6-b5 D181a6-b4 
 yan dag pa'i tshad ma  Aid kyis sgrub po // 'di  ltar  duos po rnams la don dam 
 pa'i  no bo  Aid  cigl yod par gyur na rnam pa  giiis kho nar 'gyur  te / thams 
 cad rgyu dan rkyen la rag las  te / skye ba'i phyir mi rtag pa'i  no bo  Aid yin 
 te / dper na mdo sde pa  dan / rnal 'byor spyod pa pa rnam 'dod pa  lta bu  gig 
 gam / ran  bgin gyis yan dag par grub pa'i bdag  Aid kyi phyir  brtan2 pa'i 
 khons su gtogs pa  gig yin  te / dper na mu stegs can la sogs pa dog gis3 bdag 
 la sogs pa kun pa rtags pa rtags pa  lta bu  gig yin gran / rtag pa  dan mi rtag 
 pa dag ni phan tshun spans  te gnas pa'i mtshanid yin pa'i phyir  phut po 
 gsum pa ni med do  // no  bo  Aid 'dir rnam pa  giii ga yan don dam pa par mi 
 run ste / de sgrub par byed pa'i  tshad ma med pa'i phyir  daft / gnod par 
 byed pa yan srid pa'i phyir ro  1/ 'di  ltar mnon sum mam4 / rjes su dpag pa 
 gig sgrub par byed pa'i  tshad ma yin par 'gyur  gran na / de  la  duos po'i no 
 bo  Aid  dan po ni  gni gas kyan yan dag par 'grub pa med do // 'di  ltar rgyu 
 dan 'bras ba'i  duos po grub na / de 'grub par 'gyur  ba  gig na / rgyu daft 
 'bras bu'i  duos  po de yan re  gig  mnon sum gyi sgo nas ni don dam par mi 
 'grub po  1/ de ni  dban  po las byun ba'i  mnon sum mam /  ran rig pa'i  ninon 
 sum gyis 'grub  grans tshu rol mthon  ba rnams rnal 'byor pa'i  mnon sum gyis 
 the  shad mi 'dogs pa'i phyir dan / yid kyi mnon sum gan la yan ma grags 
 pa'i phyir de dag gis ni de 'grub par ni mi bsam mo // 1. D. gcig 2. D. brten 
 3. P has / bdag  la sogs pa dag gis / 4. P 'am 5. P has / 
 "  (The Yogacara-madhyamika) prove (that all things are devoid of intrinsic 
 nature  (nihsvabhava)) by the method of the valid means of cognition  (pramana). 
 This is because, if all things have intrinsic nature  (svabhiiva) in absolute truth , 
 there would be two kinds of intrinsic nature. That is to say, 1) because all 
 things are produced by depending upon cause (hetu) and condition  (Pratyaya), 
 they have a temporary (anitya) intrinsic nature such as that which  Sautrantika 
 or  YogEcara school assert, or 2) because all things can  be established as a real 
 by nature, they are belonged to the class of immovables (drdha) such as the 
 self  (atman) which is imagined by non-Buddhist. It is impossible that a third 
 alternative can be established because the eternal (nitya) and the temporary 
 (anitya) are mutually exclusived  (paraspara-parihara-sthiti-lakfana). 
 The two kinds of intrinsic nature are not reasonabk with respect to view of 
 this intrinsic nature from the standpoint of absolute truth  (Paramarthatas). This 
 is because there is no the valid means of cognition  (Pranaina) to prore these 
 two and because there is also way of rejecting them. The reason is that either 
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 truth that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature. Although this method 
 of negation itself characterizes the tradition of the Madhyamika begin-
                                         (25) 
 ning with  Nagarjuna (circa A. D. 150-250) and continued by his 
 followers Arya-Deva (c. A. D. 170-2702)5,) Buddhapalita (c. A. D.  470-
 (25) (25) 
 540),  Bhavaviveka (c. A. D. 500-570) and Candrakirti (c. A. D.  600-
     (25) 
  650), it was k.-ntaraksita,  Kamalagila, and Haribhadra that embraced 
 this method and integrated with it the formal logic of Dharmakirti. 
  Applying this new synthesis with systems of debate, they sought to 
  establish the principle of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature 
 (nihsvabheiva) and refuted the two theories within the  Yogacara school 
  of Satyakara and  Alikakara. They went on to refute even the view of 
                              (26) 
  Dharmakirti as a Satyakara-vadin, though the latter vacillates between 
  the position of the  Sautrantika and Satyakara-vadin depending on the 
      (27) 
  context.  Kamalagila, in his  Mal, seeks to demonstrate that all things are 
   direct perception  (pratyaksa) or logical inference  (anumiiva) is (necessary) to 
    prove them. In this case, the first intrinsic nature cannot be proven by means 
    of two kinds (of the valid means of cognition) as a true existence. This is 
    because if a causation can be established, it (viz., a temporary intrinsic  nature)
    could be proven. Firstly cousation cannot be proven as a real existence from the 
   standpoint of absolute truth by means of direct perception  (Pratyaksa). If it 
    (viz., causation) can be established, it could be proven by means of the direct
    perception of either the sense organs  (indriya-pratyaksa) or self-cognition 
 (svasarhvedana-pratyaksa). The two kinds of the direct perception of a seer 
 (yogi-pratyaksa) and mentarity  (mano-pratyaksa), because ordinary people do 
    not judge depending upon the direct perception of a seer and the direct 
    perception of mentality, cannot be acknowledge in any case." 
  (25) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid Note 5, p. 2, 7, 9. 
  (26) cf. 3. III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRADVAYA. 
    Tosaki Hiromasa 
 Pramatiaviirttika Genryosho no  Wayakukenkyri (16)  •  )11-T  4
 tNIVDTZUFP,(16) (Japanese Translation with Annotation of  PV  IQ KK° 
    320-340), Tetsugaku Nenpo (1979). p 46. Note (50).  PV  11, K 328. 
  (27) D. Malvania.  DurvekamiAra's Dharmsttarapradipa (Being a subcommentary 
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devoid of intrinsic nature by the dual method of the valid means of 
cognition  (pramiiva) and testimony (agama). In particular, he gives 
much attention to proof by the valid means of cognition  (pramana). 
 As he stated, "It is not only by testimony or a reduction to absurdity 
 (prasaitga) that we  (Yogacara-madhyamika) intend to prove that all 
things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhiiva), but by the method 
                                  (28) 
of the valid means of cognition  (prameina)." 
 Kamalagila and Haribhadra demonstrate that assertions of the  Saty-a-
kara and  Alikalcara-vad  ins cannot be proven by the two valid means of 
congnition  (pramava), that is to say, direct perception  (pratyaksa) and 
                            (29) 
inference  (anumiina) respectively. 
 It is especially causation that they scrutinize by these two valid 
                        (30) 
means of cognition  (pramanct), because if causation can be established, 
some intrinsic nature  (svabhava) would be allowed as a reality, for 
                                                   (31) i
nstance, either an eternal or a temporary intrinsic nature would be 
established. 
 III. The essential focus of the refutation 
 III. A. The focus of the refutation of the view of  Satyakara-vad  in 
  on Dharmottara's  NyayabindutTka, a commentary on Dharmakirti's  Nyayabindu). 
  (TSWS, Vol. II. Patna 1955) Introduction pp. xxii-xxiii. 
 Tosaki Hiromasa, Idem (17). p. 46. Note (51), Idem (18), (1981).  p. 104. 
 Moreover  Dharmakirti takes the position of the  Alikaldra-vadin, too. Cf. 
 Tosaki Hiromasa. Idem (17), p. 17. Note (70). PV  , K 354, 355, 357, 358. 
 Idem (16). PV KK° 330-331. Tosaki. Ibid. (Bukkyo Ninshikiron no Ke-
 nkya) pp. 312-315. PV K 212, 213, 217. Mimaki Katsumi. Ibid. (BLO 
 GSAL GRUB MTHA').  XI  : Yogacara. pp. 101-103. 
(28)  Mal  P198a5-6 D181a6 
 kho bo cag  kyan tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad no  bo  hid med par  sgrub pa 
 yan ma yin la / thal bar sgrub pa tsam gyis  kyan ma yin no // 'o na  Ze na / 
 yan dag pa'i tshad ma  riid kyis sgrub  po  // 
(29) (30) (31) cf. Note 24 
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lies in pointing out contradictions that occur when they assert that 
images  (akara) such as color blue are always real. 
 The focus of refutation in the  Mal of  Kamala§ila is as follows : 
 (32—   "If you [viz .,  Saty-alara-vatd  in] assert that images  (elkdra) are real, 
  then [the cognition  (vijfiCina) that should be expected to be unitary 
 (ekatva)) would become manifold just like the nature of images 
  themselves because images  (akiira) of cognition with respect to such 
                 (32a) 
  things as pictures and so forth are manifold. If it is correct to 
  understand that manifold cognition  (vijnana) arises in order to 
  establish the principle of manifold images  (iikara), then it would be 
  impossible to have a cognition  (vijfiana) which grasps images 
 (akiira) that exist as if they cover an object. This is because it is 
  impossible for cognition  (vijii  dna), as something non-material  (amii-
  rtatva), to occupy space. It is also not reasonable for something 
  which does not occupy space to have any distinction such as north 
(32)  Mal  P200b2-6 D183a6-b2 
 ean  yan gal  to rnam pa rnam pa rnams  yan dag pa  Aid du 'dod na de'i tshe 
 ri mo rkyan pa  la sogs pa dag la  ses  pa'i rnam pa sna tshogs yin  pa'i phyir 
 rnam pa  bin du tha dad par  thal bar 'gyur ro //  gan gis na rnam pa sna 
 tshogs  Aid  gzun gzugs pa'i phyir  ges pa du ma skye bar rtogs2 pa legs par  '
gyur ba roam par  ges pa yul  la bkram pa lta bur 'dug par  yons su 'dzin par 
 skye  ba  yan med de / lus can ma yin pa la yul na gnas pa mi srid pa'i phyir 
 dal). / yul na mi gnas pa  rnams  kyan  byan  dan /  gar  la sogs pa'i phyogs kyi 
 bye brag  to skye bar mi run ba'i phyir ro // de  ltar mi skye na  yan3 yul la 
 bkram pa lta bur  snail  ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro //  ges pa gcig dan  no bo tha 
 dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir  ges pa'i  no bo  bzin du rnam pa rnams  no bo  Aid 
 gcig par thal ba  yan yin no // tha dad pa yin na ni de dag  kyan don  bflm du 
 ges pas 'dzin par  mi'  thad de / don  gian yin pa'i phyir ro // de 'dzin par bya 
 ba'i phyir rnam pa  gian  dan  gian du rtog na  yan rnam pa rnams thug pa med 
 par 'gyur ro  // roam pa  Oan dan  gtan  rayon ba yan nam  yan med do  // 1. D 
 brkyan  ba 2. P togs 3. P om. 
(32a) PV.  II.  205ab 
 vijatinam  anarambhan  nalakhyadau  vicitradhitt / 
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   and east. And this is because, since cognition  (vzjii  dna) does not 
   have any direction, it is impossible that  (images  (akara)) can appear 
 (within cognition  (viiiiiina)D as if they are spread over an object. 
   Since images  (aara)  (that should be expected to be manifold 
   (aneka)) do not differ from unitary cognition  (vzjii  dna) by nature, 
   they must then have a unitary nature, like the nature of cognition 
 (mjnana-svartitpavat). On the other hand, if [images  (iikara)] differ 
  from  (cognition  (vzjiiiina)) by nature, they could not be grasped by 
   cognition, like an object. In the latter case,  (cognition and  images) 
 differ from each other. If, in order to grasp  [an  image) , you  (Satyd-
   kdra-vadin) require the imagining of images one after another , this 
   would mean an infinite regress  (anavastha) . For images  (iikeira) can 
 -.32) 
   never be perceived in succession." 
  This method of focusing on the incompatibility of unity (ekatva) and 
manifoldness (aneka) between cognition  (vzjiiiina) and images  (akiira) 
is found in the writing of  Santaraksita ,  Kamalagila, and Haribhadra. 
It was also adopted by  Ratnalaraganti (c .  11c), who was a  Alikalara-
                                                       (33)vad  in
, when he refuted the view of  Jriana§rimitra (c. 980-1030), who 
                  (34) 
was a Satyakara-vadin.  Kamalagila and Haribhadra have inherited this 
 (35) 
manner of debate from  §a.ntaraksita who had adopted it when refuting 
the four kinds of causation. Going back further this refutation of the 
                  (36) f
our kinds of causation can be traced to the  Satyadvayavibhaitga 
(33) Concerning this date see Kajiyama  Yuichi44110—,  Kaki Indo Bukkyo no 
 Ronrigaku ani4NuAorda*(Indian Buddhist Logic in the Later Period.) 
 p. 245. Koza  Bukkyo  Shiso No. 2 ,IMIGREE Ninshikiron Ronrigaku r2,4-1 
    g.* (1974). 
(34) Katsura Shoryu. cf. Note 15 p. 32 
(35) SDP D 28b6 
(36) SDNS (2) pp. 119-128 
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                     (37) (38) 
(SDV) of  Jnanagarbha (c. 700-760), verse XIV. How then is the 
incompatibility of unity (ekatva) and manifoldness (aneka) with respect 
to cognition (vijfi dna) and images  (akdra)  established  ? 
 In the  Mal of  Kamala§ila, this incompatibility is used to refute the 
view of  Satyalara-vadin when he demonstrates that causation cannot be 
proven by means of direct perception  (pratyaksa) as sense perception 
              (39) 
 (indriya-pratyaksa). Incompatibility is shown to occur when cognition 
 (vzjiidna) that should be expected to be a unity (ekatva) logically 
becomes manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images  (akc-ira-svard-
patva). The model for this argument has been directly taken from the 
                     (40) 
refutation of atomic theory. He makes it clear that the errors  (dosa) 
which were found in the case of examining an atom  (paramwAt) pertain 
also in this case, because cognition  (vi  jfidna) that should be expected 
to be unity (ekatva) and immaterial  (amdrtatva) would have extension 
 (dega-vitiina) or portions  (sdvayavatc7), like an atom, and would be 
                           (41) d
evoid of a single nature (ekatva). 
  In conclusion,  Kamalagila points out that the Satyakara-vadin's view 
involves a contradiction of direct perception  (pratyaksa) itself in that 
 AAPV W pp.  96926-97618 V pp.54922_55325cf. Note 8 
(37) Concerning this date see Katsumi Mimaki cf. Note 3, INTRODUCTION 
  p. 4. 
(38) SDK XIV  D2a6-bl, SDV D7a6, SDP D 28b6 
 du mas gcig gi  &los mi byed  // du mas du ma byed ma yin  // gcig gis du 
 ma'i  &los mi byed  // gcig gis gcig byed pa  yafi  min  // cf.  SD  NS (2) p. 119. 
(39)  mai  P198135  D181135 
 de  la re  iig  dban  po'i  ninon sum gyis ni de mi  'grub ste /    Mal  P200b2-6 
 D183a6-b2 cf. Note 32 
(40) cf. Translation  11-1-A-2-11-1-A-2-4 
  Concerning  gantaraWta see Yuichi Kagiyama. cf. Note 8 pp. 127-8 
(41) cf. Note 32, Translation 
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direct perception, in this case, includes imagingary thought-construction 
(vikalpa) because it grasps not only the unique particular  (svalak.sana) 
that is the object of direct perception  (pratyaksa) but also the universal 
 (samiinyalak.sana) that exists by definition within imaginary thought-
                 (42) 
construction (vikalpa). In the same manner, Haribhadra also refutes 
their view by pointing out that it is contrary to the definition of direct 
        (43) 
perception, which is devoid of imaginary thought-construction (vikalpa). 
This is because cognition itself involves imaginary thought-construction 
when multiple cognitions  (anekajfieina) occurs at the same time  (yuga-
  (44) 
pad). 
 III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRADVAYA 
 Citradvaya means that cognition (vzjiiiina) which possesses manifold 
(42)  Mal P202b6-7  D185a6-7 
 gal  te  ninon sum ni rtog pa'i no bo  nid tsam  iig yin no  ie na /  'o na ni  mnon 
 sum ran gi mtshan  nid kyi yul can ma yin  te /  rtogsl pa'i no bo  nid ni spyi'i 
 mtshan  nid kyi yul can  yan yin pa'i phyir ro // 1. D rtog 
 Massaki Hattori. ibid. Note 1, pp. 79-80. 
(43) NB, I. 4. 
 tatra  pratyaksarn  kalpanapoclham  abhrantam. Th. Sthcherbatsky,  Nyayabindu of 
 Dharmakirti with  Nyayabindufikd of Dharmottara, Bibl. Bud. VII, 1977, p. 6. 
 Masaaki Hattori. ibid. Note. 1.  p. 25. 
 Perception  (pratyaka) is free from conceptual construction  (kalpana):  pratyak-
 §arn  kalpanapoclham. And pp. 82-83 
 cf. Note 20.  Mal P.  202b"  D185a4-6. 
 On the other hand, Dharmakirti proves  `Patyalqa7h  kalpaniipoelham' on the 
 ground that a unitary cognition perceives manifoldness. (See Hiromasa Tosaki, 
 ibid. Note 20, p. 307.) 
 PV. II. 207 
 nanarthaika bhavet  tasmat siddhato'pi avikalpika / vikalpayann apy  ekarthath 
 yato' nyad api  pagyati // 
(44) cf. Translation  (II-1-A-2-5), PV. II. 197ab. athaikayatanatve' pi  nanekarn 
 grhyate  sakrt / 
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                    (45) 
(citra) images is unitary. The  Satyakara-vadin school asserts that 
cognition is always accompanied by a number of images  (clkeira) which 
are real (satya); however, any imaginary thought-constructions (vikalpa) 
with respect to these real images  (akara) such as concepts like the 
external world or the internal world, or "permanent" or "temporary", 
are in themselves always unreal additions to the images. They then 
had to answer the question of how a unitary cognition can possess 
                                                      (46)
many images. That is why they advocate the theory of citradvaya. This 
                                                  (47) 
position was taken by  Prajriakaragupta (c. A. D. 700-750) in his com-
mentary, the  Pramavaviirtikabhdsyarn, on verses 200 and 221 of chapter 
                                        (48) 
II  (Pratyaksa) of Dharmakirti's  Pramanavarttika. 
 (49.-  "Although cognition has manifold images ,  it is none other than 
  unitary. This is because cognition, having manifold images, differs 
  by nature from the manifoldness of the external world itself. The 
  manifoldness of the external world is distinguishable,  but manifold 
  images of cognition such as the color blue are indistinguishable. 
  The reason is that the images such as the color blue that are the 
  contents of perception itself  cannot be perceived independently.
  Accordingly, although cognition is maniford, it is unitary because 
 -49) 
  images such as the color blue cannot be seperately discriminated." 
                                     (50) 
 How did Haribhadra then refute this theory? As mentioned above, 
(45) (46) (48) Oki  Kazufumi.Pf-LIP. 
 "Dharmakirti no  Citradvaita  riron; Dharmakirti ((citradvaita))  aro" (Theory 
 of Dharmakirti's  citradvaita). JIBS Vol. XXI No. 2, Mar. 1973 p. 975 
(47) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid. Note 33. p. 245. 
(49) Oki  Ka  zufumi 
 "Citradvaita riron no  tenkai-Prajriakaragupta no Ronjutsu— ((citradvaita))  33/  OD 
 Ral —Prajnakaragupta  0)  f—" (Development of theory of citradvaita). Tokai 
 Bukkyo No. 20, Dec. 1975, p.  9215-22 and Note 8. 
(50) cf. Translation  II-1-B—II-1-B-4 
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 Kamalagila and Haribhadra reached their refutation of the  Satyakara-
vadin view by pointing out that the  Satyalara-vadin assertion involves 
a contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyaksa) . In the 
case of  citradvaya as well, Haribhadra refutes this stance by utilizing 
the same method. Namely, their ground of asserting that a unitary 
cognition possesses manifold images (akara) is based upon the notion 
that manifold images such as the colors blue , yellow, and so forth which 
manifest at one moment, cannot be distinguished from one another by 
direct perception (pratyaksa). However , Haribhadra refutes this as 
follows : the presumption that manifold images cannot be distinguished 
                                                          (51) bydirect
perception also cannot be ascertained by direct perception. 
 III. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of the  Alikakara -vadin . 
 The  Alikakara-vadin defines image  (akara) as the images of the 
perceived and the peceiver  (griihya-grahakakiira). According to their 
theory,an image  (iikiira) is none other than imaginary and unreal (alika) , 
while only self-cognition  (svasaivedana), which is detached from both 
the images of the perceived and the perceiver, is real . Accordingly, self-
cognition means a nondual cognition  (advaya-jiiiina) and has only the 
operation of perception. Therefore, unreal images have nothing to do 
with real self-cognition, because unreal things cannot have any relation 
to some other thing. This is because, if self-cognition has some relation 
to unreal images, it would become unreal, like the image  (akara) . 
Then, how can the nondual cognition  (advaya-jii  ana) asserted by them , 
which is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver , 
(51) cf. Note 42, 43. Translation II-1-B-3 (Conclusion 1). Direct perception 
 (pratyaksa) does not grasp both distinction and nondistinction. 
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be proven? 
 (a)  Kamalagila shows that nondual cognition  (advaya-Plana) cannot 
be proven by inference  (anumatta). Namely, he states that none of the 
logical reasons (hetu), a relation of identity  (svabhdva), effect  (kiirya), 
or non-perception (anupalabdhi), can be used to establish a proof. 
 (52••• 
  If images that manifest as two [viz.,  greihya-griihaka] are also unreal, 
 as  Alikakara-vadin asserts], how can cognition exist as something 
  with a nature apart from these in absolute truth? A real cognition 
  that is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver 
  cannot be perceived by ordinary people. Otherwise everyone could 
  obtain the truth. 
    It [viz., self-cognition that is devoid of both images of the perce-
  ived and the perceiver] cannot be proven by inference  (anurnatta). 
  This is because any logical reason to prove it cannot be established. 
(52) Mal P180b6-181a3  D166a1-6 
 gnis su  snail ba  yan brdzun pa  riid yin na ni  g  es pa'i  no bo  gall don dam par 
 srid par 'gyun  ba  gan ci  gig lus /  ges pa de kho na  riid  gzun ba dan 'dzin 
 pa'i rnam pa  dan bral ba  gan ni tshu  rol  mthoii  ba rnams kyis  yan dag par 
 myoti  ba med de / thams cad de kho na  nid mthon  ba kno na  nid du  thal bar 
 'gyur ro // de ni rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas  nes pa  yan ma yin  te / de  lta bu'i 
 rtags  riid ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'di  ltar re  zig ran  bzin gyi rtags las  byun 
 has rjes su dpag pa ni mi srid de / d'i ran  bin  riid bsgrub par bya  ba yin 
 pa'i phyir ro / 'bras2 bu'i rtags  kyan ma yin  te /  griis su med pa  dan 'ga'  yan 
 Than cig rgyu dan 'bras bu'i  duos por ma grub pa'i phyir  te / de ni  dban pos 
 mi sod pa'i phyir ro  // de las ma gtogs pa'i 'bras bu  gan yod pa  yan ma yin 
 te / 'di  ltar khyed kyi  ltar na  griis su med pa de kho na 'bras bur 'gyur  ba 
 gig na de  riid bsgrub par bya  ba  riid kyi skabs yin pa'i phyir de  yan tshad 
 mas grub pa ma yin no /  griis su  snail  ba  gan yin pa de ni ri  bon gi rva  dan 
 'dra ba'i phyir 'bras bu ma yin no //  gan gis na mnon sum  dan mi dmigs pas 
 sgrub pa rgyu  dan 'bras bu'i  duos  po 'grub par 'gyur  ba don dam par  griis su 
 med pa'i  ges pas kyan 'ga'  yan 'dzin pa med do // mi dmigs pa  yari dgag pa 
 sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir yod pa sgrub pa'i skabs ma yin no // 1. P om. 2. P 
 'bas. 
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   To begin with, inference based on a relation of identity  (svabhava) is 
  impossible. This is because the identity of it  (self-cognition as a 
  nondual  cognition] with some other thing is the very thing to be 
    proven. 
    Inference based on an effect  (karya) is impossible. This is because 
   it is untenable that a non-dual thing (viz., self-cognition being 
  devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) has a causal 
   relation with something else. It (viz., self-cognition as a nondual-
  cognition) cannot be perceived by a sense organ (indriya). A diffe-
   rent result apart from it (viz., self-cognition) does not exist. 
    The reason is that, according to your theory, the nondual thing 
   (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived 
  and the perceiver) itself would become the result, but that is the very 
  thing to be proven. Neither can it be shown by the valid means of 
  cognition  (pramdna). Because the two manifestations  (of the images 
  of the perceived and the  perceiver) are equivalent to the horns of a 
  rabbit  (viz.,  non-existence)  (according to your  theory), it is not a
  result. Otherwise,  (if both images of the perceived and the perceiver
  exist in  self-cognition), causality, which can be proven by direct 
  perception  (pratyaksa) and non-perception (anupalabdhi), could be 
  established. However, nothing can be perceived by non-dual cogni-
  tion  (advaya-jileina) from the point of view of absolute truth  (para. 
  marthatas). Non-perception (anupalabdhi) is not an inference to 
  prove the reality [of non-dual  cognition), because it is a proof of 
 --52) 
   nonexistence. 
 (b) Moreover,  Kamalagila refutes the view of the  Alikakara-vadin 
that non-dual cognition  (advaya-jfkina) is real by means of pointing 
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out that there is  neither the relation of identity  (tadatmya) nor causa-
tion (tadutpatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images 
 (alikdkara). Even though images  (iikdra) are unreal (alika), the  id  entity 
of cognition and images should be acknowledged as long as these unreal 
images manifest in cognition. If so, both cognition and images would 
become unreal. Thus  Kamala§ila points out that the view of  Alikakara-
vadin involves contradiction. 
 (53••   If 
the nature of cognition  (jnana) is real (satya), there is neither 
  the relation of identity  (taddtmya) nor causation (tadutpatti) between 
  a thing which truly  manifests. and images  (clkeira) having an unreal 
  nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (satya) and 
  the unreal (alika), which are mutually exclusive  (paraspara-pariVdra-
  sthiti-laksana), to have the relation of identity  (tadatmya) and this 
  does not explain how the unreal is produced from something. Even 
  though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, the two (viz., 
  cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity 
(53)  Mal  P182b3-8  D167b3-7 
 ges pa'i bdag  nid bden pa'i  no  bo de la ni  gat' gis na de la de  ltar gsal rab 
 tu  snare bar 'gyur  ba brdzun pa'i bdag  nid kyi rnam pa rnams de'i bdag nid 
 dan / de las  byun ba'i mtshan  nid kyi 'brel pa 'ga'  yan med be // bden pa 
 dan mi bden pa phan tshun spans  te gnas pa'i mtshan  riid dag ni de'i bdag 
 nid du 'gal ba'i phyir la / mi bden pa  yan  gan las  kyan skye bar khas mi len 
 pa'i phyir ro // de skye na  yan 'di dag dus gcig  tu de'i bdag  hid du  snail bar 
 ni mi 'gyur  te / rgyu dan 'bras bu dag ni dus  dan  no  bo  nid tha dad pa yin 
 pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na gdon mi za bar rtogs pa'i  no  bo dan tha mi dad 
 pa'i ran gi  no bo'i rnam pa mi bden pa'i bdag  nid rnams  snail bar khas  blahs  1••• -.1 
 ba'i phyir de'i bdag  nid kyi mtshan  nid kyis 'brel  bare khas  blan dgos so // de'i 
 phyir  gni ga'  an brdzun pa  nid du gyur to  // de lta ma yin na ni ji ltar 
 brdzun pa'i rnam pa rnams dan  Than cig rtogs  pa'i  no  bo  iiid de'i bdag  hid du 
 hams su  myon bar 'gyur / de  has na bden pa la  mason par  gen pa'i  gags pa 'di 
 'or cig / 1. P om. 2. D par 
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 (tadiltmya) at the same time. This is because  cause and effect are 
   different from each other with repect to time and their own nature . 
     [Accordingly there is no causation (tadutpatti) between a true
   nondual cognition  (advayajniina) and an unreal image  (iikara) .] 
   It is unreasonable that the manifestation [of  images] is certified in
   spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reductio-
   nistic  (atiprasaitga). Accordingly you should surely acknowledge a 
   relation of identity  (tiidatmya) between them, since the manifestation 
   of unreal images [in the present  case], which do not differ from 
   the nature of cognition, are acknowleged. Thus both of them become 
   unreal (alika). Otherwise  Cif there is not a relation of identity 
   between cognition and  images), how can an unreal image  (iikara) 
   and the nature of cognition be perceived as an identity? Consequently 
 -.53) 
   cut this string of attachment to [only nondual  cognition] as real . 
  IV. Conclusion 
  The method and contents of refuting the views of the  Satyakara and 
 Alikakara-vad  in are common to the MAK and MAV of  Santaraksita , 
the MAP and  Mal of  Kamalagila, and the AAPV of Haribhadra. 
  In the case of refuting the view of the  Satyakara-vadin , the incompa-
tibility of unity (eka) and manifoldness (aneka) between cognition 
 (vzjiiiina) and images  (akara) is pointed out. In conclusion,  Kamalagila 
and  Haribhadra show the error that this view involves, which is a 
contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyaksa) in that direct 
perception that should be expected to be devoid of imaginary thought-
construction (vikalpa) becomes related to imaginary thought-construction . 
 On the other hand, in case of refuting the view of  Alikakara-vadin , 
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they show that the nondual cognition  (advaya-jiiiina) which is 
devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver  (griihya-grahakii-
kara) cannot be proven by inference  (anumana) such as a relation of 
identity  (svabhava), effect  (karya) or non-perception (anupalabdhi). 
Moreover it is pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity 
 (tiidatmya) nor a causal relation (tadutpatti) between the nondual cog-
nition and unreal images  (alika-kara). 
 In light of these refutations,  Kamala§ila and Haribhadra cannot be 
considered as belonging to either the Satyakara-vadin or the  Alikakara-
vadin. This is also true for.a.-ntaraksita. Nevertheless we should examine 
the sound basis on which they have been called the major philosophers 
of the Yogacara-madhyamika school and how they are distinguished 
from other philosophers of the Madhyamika school, such as  Bhavaviveka 
who is a Sautrantika-madhyamika and Candrakirti who is a  Prasangika. 
At the same time, we should ask what the philosophy of  Yogacara 
means in the context of  Kamala§ila's philosophy. At the outset we 
should note that  Kamalagila describes the philosophy of  Yogacara in 
the sense of a school accepting only subjective reality  (vijiiiina-matra) 
or mind-only  (citta-matra), as suitable for the attainment of the final 
                                                          (54) 
truth of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhava). 
Namely, he conceives of the philosophy of  Yogacara as a good approach 
                                  (54) 
to the absolute truth of the Madhyamika. However this philosophy seems 
to be insignificant for  Kamalagila, apart from its context as a theoretical 
                                          (55) 
means to arrive at the highest Madhyamika truth. 
(54) cf. Note 56. 
(55)  Mal  P194a8-b'  D177135 
  mar me la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don gyi  no bo'am  §es pa'i no  bo  yan dag par 
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 This may be seen in the  Mal of  Kamalagila. The  Yogacara depend-
ing on scriptures such as the  Sanahinirmocana and the  Gahanavyitha 
asserts that all things consist in subjective reality  (vzjiiiina-mdtra) or 
mind-only  (citta-matra), that only mind is an absolute existant, and 
that except for mind nothing exists. Therefore, they object to the 
position that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature  (nikvabheiva) can 
be proven.  Kamalagila has replied to this objection of  Yogacara. 
 (56.•   Th
ese  [scriptures] are not suitable for testimony. The existence of 
 ni ma grub ste / Whether a lamp has the nature of an object (artha) as the 
 external world or of cognition  (vijiiana) cannot be decided from the standpoint 
 of absolute truth. 
 BhK  1[  . P53b6  D49a1 
 don dam par na sems  kyan bden par mi run ste  / It is impossible from 
 the point of view of the highest truth that mind Cas well as objects of 
 the external worlod) is real. 
 BhK  . pp. 6-7. 
 Cittam api  paramarthato  maylivad anutpannam  / Mind is also non-arising 
 just like illusion from the viewpoint of the highest truth. 
(56)  Mal P170b4-171a7,  D156b7-157131 
 de  yan  khuns su mi run  ba  riid de / ji  ltar sems yod pa  riid du bstan pa de 
 bin du gzugs  kyan mdo de dan de las rnam pa du mar yod pa  riid du bstan 
 pa kho na ste / de'i phyir de  yan ci ste don dam par yod pa  riid du mi  bzun /  'on  te don tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir  dan / mdo  glan dag las kyan bkag pa'i 
 phyir don dam par yod par rnam par mi  glagl ste /  gan zag la bdag med pa 
 tsam  la  &Lig pa la ldem por dgons pas gtul bar bya ha de lta  bu'i  bsam pa 
 la  ltos  te / de bstan pa 'ba'a  lig  tu zad do les bya bar brjod na gal  te de  lta 
 na ni sems kyan 'og nas 'byun ba'i tshed mas gnod pa'i phyir  daft / de mdo 
 gzan las  kyan /  no  bo  hid med pa  riid du bstan pa'i phyir don dam pa riid 
 du ma 'dzin par sems tsam po  riid de ni rim gyis don dam pa'i tshul gyi rgya 
 mtsho la  gzuri ba'i phyir bstan pa 'ba'a  lig  tu zad do  sham du zun  §ig3 /4 'di 
 ltar  gab  ig cig car chos ma lus pa  no  bo  riid med pa  riid du rtogs par mi 
 nus pa de re  fig sems tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phyi'i don no  bo  riid med 
 pa  riid la 'jug go  // de  Aid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par  lta na rnams kyi  // 
 gzun dan 'dzin pa 'gag par 'gyur  /1  les  gsuns so  // de'i 'og  tu rim gyis sems 
 kyi  fio  bo  riid la so sor rtog na / de  yan bdag med pa  riid du  khoti du chud 
 nas zab mo'i tshul  la 'jug par 'gyur  te / de skad du / bcom ldan 'das kyis / 
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 color-form  (rupa) as well as mind is explained in various manners 
 in several different scriptures. Accordingly why don't you understand 
 that it [viz., color-form  (rtitfict)) also exists from the standpoint of 
 absolute truth? 
 [Objection:] The object of the external world cannot be established 
 from the standpoint of absolute truth  (paramarthatas), since it 
 involves a contradiction with respect to the valid means of cognition 
 (prameitta) and since it is denied in other scriptures also. The 
 object of the external world is just stated according to the aim of 
  disciples (vineya) who want to arrive at only the non-existence of 
  the essential nature in a person  (pudgala-nairiitmya), because of the 
  secret purpose of the scriptures of leading them there. 
 (Answer:) If so, since mind (citta) is also refuted through the 
 valid means of cognition  (prameitta), which will be stated later on, 
  and since it is explained as devoid of intrinsic nature  (nihsvabhilva) 
  even in other scriptures, you should understand that this theory of 
  mind-only  (citta-m-dtra) was taught only to help one comprehend
  the ocean of the theory of absolute truth without regarding it as an 
 56a•• 
sems tsam la ni brten nas su  I phyi rol don la mi rtog go  // de  buin na  nid 
la dmigs nas ni  // sems tsam las  kyan bzla bar bya  // sems tsam las ni bzlas 
nas su  //  snap ba med la bzla bar bya  /l  snan med gnas pa'i rnal 'byor pa  J/ 
des ni theg pa chen  po  mthon  /J  'jug pa lhun gyis grun  cin  ii  I smon lam dag 
gis rnampar  sbyans  // ye ges dam pa bdag me pa Isnailba med la mi 
        -56a 
 mthon no  //  ces  gsuns so  1/  0an dag na re sems tsms ni ran gis rab  tu grub 
 pa'i  no bo  riid yin pa'i phyir kun rdzob  tu gnas pa kho na yin la / phyi'i don 
 ni kun rdzob  tu  yan mi gnas  te / sems kyi rnam pa las ma gtogs par de grub 
 pa med pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de rab  tu bstan pa'i ched du bcom  ldan  'das kyis dnos po rnams sems tsam  riid du bstan gyi / de don dam par yod pa 
 riid ni ma yin  te / mdo  gian las de  yan  no bo  riid med pa  riid du bstan pa'i 
 phyir  te / (1) P hass  biag (2) P has las  bltos  (3) P has  lig (4) P om. 
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  absolute existent. The reason is that those who cannot recognize all 
  things as devoid of intrinsic nature  (niltsvabhava) in one moment, 
  recognize gradually that an object as the external world is devoid of 
  intrinsic nature by firstly depending upon the theory of mind-only 
 (56-1•• 
 (citta-matra). Therefore, [the Blessed  One] taught that the perceived 
  and the perceiver  (grahya-grahaka) are destroyed by those who  ex-
                                                                          •56-1) 
  amined [the external  world] by means of reason (yukti). After that, 
  when they gradually scrutinize the nature of mind, recognizing its 
  being devoid of intrinsic nature too, they would comprehend the 
  profound theory. The Blessed One taught as follows: 
 (56a--   D
epending upon mind-only  (citta-matra), the Yogin does not imagine 
  an object in the external worid. Observing truth, he should transcend 
  mind-only. After transcending mind-only, he should transcend non-
  manifestation [of the perceived and the perceiver]. The Yogin who thus 
  abide in  non-manzfestafion beholds the great vehicle  (mandydna). 
  The spontaneous stage  (andbhoga) which he reaches is tranquil and 
  is purified by his devout vow. He observes that even perfect wisdom is 
  devoid of intrinsic nature by means of the  non-manifestation [of 
 •-56a) 
  non-dual cognition]. 
    Some other scholars advocate as follows : 
 (56-1) LAS, X-154ab 
 yukty5."  vipaiyamananaria  grahagrahyarh nirdhyate / 
(56a)  Lank X. 256-258 BhK I. p.  2109-14 
 cittamatram samaruhya  bahyam  artharh na kalpayet /  tathatalambane1  sthitva 
 cittamatram atikramet  //  cittamatram atikramya  nirabhasam atikramet /  nirabh-
 asasthito2  yogi  mandyanarh na3  pagyate //  anabhogagatih  ganta  prahidhanair 
                                                                            5•• 
 vigOdhita /  jildnam  anatmakarh4  gretharh  nirabhase na  pagyati // 1. BhK.  tat-
 hatalambane 2. BhK.  nirabh5se sthito 3. BhK. sa 4. BhK.  niratmakarh 5. BhK. 
 nirabhasena 
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 The theory of mind-only  (citta-matra) is reasonable from the stand-
 point of conventional truth  (sanivrtyci) since it is inherently establi-
 shed. On the other hand, the object of the external world is not 
 reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the 
 external world independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot 
 be established. 
   Therefore, although the Blessed One (Bhagavat) teaches that exis-
 tences are product of the mind-only in order to indicate the above 
 meaning, still he does not teach that it [viz., the existence of  mind-
 only] is reasonable from the standpoint of absolute truth  (paramar-
 thatas). This is because it is taught in other scriptures that the 
 mind [as well as colorform  (rapa)] is devoid of intrinsic nature 
 --56) 
 (nittsvabhava). 
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     4. Summary of the contents of Haribhadra's  Abhisamaya-
       lafitkaraloka.  Prajaparamitavya,khya 
 The logical formula (prayoga)  W6245 V45732 
 A thing capable of effect implies  :  [I] a thing which has a nature 
that is knowable  (jfteya-riipa) which belongs to the external world ; or 
 MD a thing which has the nature of  cognition(jfaina-rfipa).  W624" 
V4584 
 I. A thing capable of effect is a thing which has a nature that is 
knowable  (Pi  eya-rapa) which belongs to the external world.  W624'2 
V4585 
 Haribhadra refutes the view of the three kinds of atomic theory 
formulated by those who maintain that the external world is real, such 
as  [I-1]  Vaigesika,  CI-2]  Vaibhasika and  [I-3)  Sautrantika. 
 I-1. The  Vaigesika hold that things which have a knowable nature 
 (jrieya-rapa) are atoms which have intrinsic natures that are connected 
to one another  (paras-para-sakyukta-svabhava) and form a unitary 
nature.  W62416 V4587 
 This view is refuted by the following arguments : 
 I-1-1. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms 
at one spot  (eka-dega)  .  W62416 V4587 
 1-1-2. It  is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms 
to form a whole  (sarvdtmand).  W624'8 V4589 
 1-2. The  Vaibhasika hold that the atom in the center is surrounded 
by atoms that have the nature of nonadhering  (asamii  Riga), and that 
there are intervals remaining between  them(sdntara).   W62427 V45814 
 This view is refuted by the following arguments : 
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 I-2-1. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single 
nature faces the other atoms in the very same manner that it faces a 
single  atom. W6258  V45820 
 This same refutuation is also applied to the case of the  Satyakarava-
din's view. (cf.  II-1-A-2-1) 
 I-2-2. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single 
nature faces the other atoms in a different manner than it faces a single 
atom. (cf.  II-1-A-2-2).  W625'8 V45827 
 1-3. The  Sautrantika hold that atoms are an aggregation without 
intervals remaining between them (nir-antara). W62521 V45829 
 This view is refuted by the following arguments : 
 1-3-1. The directional characteristic of the atom in the center would 
be decided only by the side which is combined  (sakyoga-pak.sa) because 
 `having no interval(nairantarya)' is equivalent to  ̀ combinatio n(sankyoga).' 
 W62521 V45829 
 1-3-2. It is illogical that an uncombined  (asakyukta) atom is surro-
unded by the many atoms which are in contiguous locations  (samipatara-
dadvasthita) that are suitable to be called the side  (dik-gabda-vdcya). 
 W62524  V4583" 
 1-4.  [Conclusion  :] Distinction (bheda), which means the external 
world and which is produced by thought-construction, (kalpanoparacito) 
is not an essential component of  efficiency(arthakriydnga). W62527 
V4593 
 II. Haribhadra refutates the view of the Yogacara school (viz.,  Satya-
kdra and  Alikakara-vadins): They assert that a thing capable of effect 
(arthakriyd-yogya) means a thing which has the nature of cognition 
 (jndna-rupa). W6267  V4591° 
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 II-1. Haribhadra's refutuation of the view of  Satyakaravad  in (ones 
who assert that images are real) : They explain the production of 
cognition  (vzjiielna) according to the casual relation with images  (iikiira) 
of both the perceived and the  perceiver(graya-grelhaka) .  W626" 
V45916 
 II-1-A. According to this theory, cognition  (vij  fiiina) would become 
manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images  (likara-svarupavat) . On 
the other hand, images  (iikCira) would become a unity (ekatva) , like 
the nature of cognition  (mjfidna-svarapavat).  W626'7 V459'7 
 II-1-A-1. It is contradictory that cognition, which has a unitary 
nature, perceives manifold images  (vaictryakara)   W62620 V459" 
 II-1-A-2. It is contradictory that diverse cognitions (viffidna) of the 
same kind  (samanajcitiya) occur simultaneously like different kinds of 
cognition  (vzjatiya-jiiiinavat). W6272 V45923 
 II-1-A-2-1. It is contradictory that the cognition  (vzjildna) , which is 
thought to be situated in the center (madhya), like an atom, faces by 
nature the other cognitions in the very same manner that it faces a 
single (eka) cognition. This is because the other cognitions would 
mutually occupy the same point. (cf.  1-2-1) W6278 V45927 
 II-1-A-2-2. It is contradictory that the cognition , which is thought 
to be situated in the center, like an atom, faces other surrounding 
cognitions in a different manner. This is because it would have parts 
and it would thus be devoid of unity (ekatva). (cf.  1-2-2)  W627" 
V45929 
 II-1-A-2-3. Cognitions would be regarded as if they manifest having 
extension  (de.§a-vitana) in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but 
contrary to the fact that they do not have space  (adega) according to 
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your theory that cognition has a manifold nature.  W62713  V459" 
 II-1-A-2-4. The refutation of the view of the atomic theory can be 
applied to cognition  (vzjiiana)  W62722 V4605 
 II-1-A-2-5.  (Conclusion:) Your statement that multiple cognitions 
 (anekaiiiiina) occur at the same time (yugapad) involves a contradiction 
with respect to direct  perception(pratyaksa-virodha)  W62728  V4601° 
 II-1-B. The refutation of CITRADVAYA (the view that a cognition 
possessing manifold images is itself a  unity). W6287  V460'4 
 II-1-B-1. It is contradictory that a single cognition  (viiiitina) includes 
a manifold nature  (citra-rapa). W6287  V460'4 
  II-1-B-2. Manifoldness (citra) is incompatible with  unity(ekatva).... 
  W628'2 V460'7 
 II-1-B-3. (Conclusion 1  :) It is contradictory that manifoldness 
appears as a unity in direct perception  (pratyaksa) since direct perce-
ption does not perceive a  distinction. W62822 V46024 
  II-1-B-4.  (Conclusion 2  :) It is contradictory that manifoldness 
(citra) also is single (eka) since concentration (yoga) and tranquility 
 (ksema) are not distinguished (abhinna). This is because the fact that 
concentration and tranquility are not distinguished from each other is 
not grasped by direct perception  (pratyaksa) W629' V46028 
 11-2. Refutation of the view of the  AlikalCara-vadin (ones who assert 
that images  (iikara) are unreal).   62910 V4612 
                                      (To be continued)
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     5. A Translation of Haribhadra's  Abhisamayalaihkaraloka 
 Prajnaparamitavyakhya 
 (1o1.-  (M
ajor:) Whatever does not possess a single nature or a plural 
    nature  (ekdneka-svabhdva), does not have an intrinsic nature 
 (svabhdva) from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramdr-
    thatas): such as an illusion  (miiya). 
 (Minor:) Things set forth by some Buddists and others  (sva-para) 
    are devoid of a single nature or a plural nature  (ekaneka-
             -101) 
 svabhava). 
 (Conclusion  : Therefore, things set forth by some Buddists and 
    others are not capable of having an intrinsic  nature.) 
 (This inference) is based on the principle of the perception of the 
incompatibility with the pervasive element  (vydpakaviruddhopalabdhi). 
 This means that the  Tathagata is like an illusion  (mayopama). The 
logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible (asiddha), 
since the action (pravrtti) of a sage  (prelesdvat) is pervaded by having 
purpose (prayojana-vat). A thing  (paddrtha) capable of effect (artha-
(101) cf. MAK 1. P48b8  D53a.'-2 MAV  P52b6-6 D56b7 
 bdag dan  ggan  smra'i'  duos 'di dag /  yan dag  to na gcig pa dan // du ma'i 
 ran  bgin bral ba'i phyir // ran  Min med de gzugs  brrian  Min  // 1. MAV. PD 
 smras 
 BCP, p. 173 
 nilsvabhava ami  bhava's  tattvatat  svaparoditab /  ekanekasvabhavena  viyogat 
 pratibimbavat // 
 MAP  P89a4-6  D87b2-3 
 gan  dag1 gcig dan du ma'i ran  Min ma yin pa de dag ni don dam  pare ran 
 Min med de / dper na gzugs  brrien  Min no // bdag  dan  gian gyis smras pa'i 
 duos po rnams kyan gcig  dan du ma'i ran  Min ma yin pas  ges bya  ba ni 
 khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin  to / gcig pa  riid  dan du ma  riid dag gis 
 ran  bgin  la khyab pa'i phyir ro  //  1. D zag 2. P om. 
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  (102) (103) 
 kriyd-yogya) should be examined  (vicarya) as an object  (visaya). 
Otherwise, what sort of purpose (prayojana) can those who pursue 
effectiveness (arthakriydrthin) attain by means of investigating useless 
things  (asad-artha-paddrtha-viceira)? 
 Therefore, the thing which has an effect  (arthakriya-karin) should 
be pursued. 
 Does it (viz., a thing capable of effect) imply :  (I] a thing which 
has a nature that is knowable  (jlieya-rtipa) (which belongs to the 
external  world; or  (II) the nature of knowledge  (jfi  dna-rCtpa), because 
they (viz., a thing cognizable and cognition) are also mutually incom-
patible  (anyonya-vyavaccheda-rapatva)? 
 (I] If the first alternative is maintained, does it (viz., a nature which 
 (104•• 
is knowable  (fit'  eya-riipa))  imply  :  (I-1) intrinsic natures which are 
 --104) 
connected with one another  (paras-para-sakyukta-svabhava); or  [I-2) 
 (105•• 
a thing which is surrounded  by atoms  (paramanu) that are homogene-
ous compositions  (samana-jd  tiya), that are separated from one another 
by means of potency  (samarthya), that have the nature of nonadhering 
 (asamd§lista-svarnpa), and that have intervals remaining between them 
(102) Read thus insted of  paramartha  (W3 according to don byed pa  CP279683 
(103) Read thus instead of  viciiratt  [VI cf. P 280a' rnam par dpyad par bya 
(104)  MAV  P55a2  D59a2 
  phrad de 'tshogs nas dgos pa rtsom mo  zes zer ba  lta bu'am / 
  MAP  P94137-95a1  D92b1 
  de la kha cig na re rdul phra rab  rnamsl phan tshun reg go ties zer ro  // 1. D 
  has la phra rab 
(105)  MAV  P55a2-3 D59a2 
 yan na phan tshun mthus 'dzin gyis ma 'byar ba'i ran  bin bar' yod  cin bskor 
 ba ste / 1. D par 
  MAP  P95a'  D92b1 
 gian dag na re rigs mthun pa man  pos' bskor  ba rnams ni bar dan bcas pa 
  kho na yin la / 1. P has  pot 
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 ••105) (106)  (107•• 
 (seintara); or  [I-3) a thing which is surrounded by atoms without 
 .-107) 
intervals remaining between them  (nir-antara)  ? 
 (108.- 
  Then,  [I--1] in the first case,  [I-1-1] if X (viz ., an atom) is combined 
with Y (viz., the other atoms) at one spot  (eka-dega) , then X would 
have parts (sdvayavatva). Therefore, the single nature (ekatva)  (of an 
atom] is destroyed, since it [the atom] is combined with other atoms 
 ••108)  (
alp) having natures different from one another  (aparlipara-svabheiva) . 
 (109.. 
 (I-1-2) If you assert that an atom combines with other atoms to form 
a whole  (sarvettmand), when the atom in the front  (purva) is combined 
                               (109a) 
with another in the back  (apareinu) to form a whole  (sarvdtmanet) , the 
atom in the back also is combined with yet another in front of it . 
Therefore, no sort of atom can ever be established as a single entity 
 (eka-svabhavata) since their intrinsic natures  (svabhiiva) are mingled 
with each other on the ground that their combination  (sakyoga) 
depends on the two. 
(106) Read yad  vd according to  [W] insted of  yada  (V). 
(107) MAV P55a4  D59a3 
 ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams mi reg  kyan bar med pas reg par 'du  ges so  //1 1. 
 D om. 
 MAP P95a5 D92b4 
 gian  dag na re reg pa  yall ma yin  la bar dan bcas pa dag  kyail ma yin mod 
 kyi / 'dab' chags pa kho nar gnas so  les zer  te / 1. P mdab 
(104) (105) (107) MAK. XI ab MAV  P55a8 D59a6 
 'byar ba  dan ni bskor ba'm  // bar med rnam par gnas kyan run // 
 TS 1989 ab 
 sarhyuktath  dtarade6astharia nairantaryavyavasthitam / 
(108) MAV  P55a5-6  D59a4-5 
 phyogs gcig gis 'byar na ni cha  as yod par 'gyur  te / ran  Mn  gian  dan  gian 
 dag gis rdul  gran  dan 'byar ba'i phyir ro / 
(109) MAV P55a5 D59a4 
 bdag  riid thams cad kyis 'byor na ni rdzas rnams 'dres par 'gyur  te / rdul gyi 
 ran  biin gcig  pu  gar gis 'byar  ba de  nid  &an  dan  yan 'byar  ba'i phyir ro / 
(109a) W  aparetzlitzund 
                           — 39  —
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 This is because the atom in the front abandons its own nature 
 (sva-svabhiiva) and produces, in all respects, the nature of another at 
the back on the grounds that it is combined with another at the back 
to form a whole. And though it [viz., atom in the  front] is combined 
with  (another at the  back), it is non-existent (asattva). 
 In the same way, an atom at the back is also combined with another 
in the front. 
 For this reason, the foundation of combination  (saTilyogd.§raya)  (viz., 
atom at the  back) is non-existent (asattva) because an atom at the 
back abandons its own nature  (sva-svabhilva) and it produces, in all 
respects, the nature of the atom in the front. Therefore, since it is 
unreasonable for unity (eka) to be affirmed (vidhi) and to be denied 
 (prati.sedha), which have the characteristics of excluding each other 
 (paras-para-parihiira-sthita-lak.satta) at the same time  (ekada), how can  -109) 
 Can  atom) be of a single nature  (eka-svabhavatii)? 
 (110-•• 
 (I-2) In the second case where  (the knowable (viz., an  atom)) is 
surrounded  (by atoms with intervals remaining between  them), even 
though contact  (sakspar§a) with the same sorts  (samana-jatiya) [of 
(110) MAP P95a8-95b2  D92137-93a1 
 phyogs  griis pa  ltar na  yan rigs mthun' pa rnams dan reg par mi 'dod du chug 
 kyan / phrag ni  snail  k  a dan mun pa'i  no bo yin pa'i phyir rigs mi mthun pa 
  snail ba dan3 mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnams dan ni reg par 'dod pa  riid do / 
  snan  has mnon pa'i mun pa dan  bral ba  riid dam4 / mun pas gnas su ma byas 
 pa'i snail  ba dan bral  ba  riid ni rigs pa dan ldan pa ma yin  te / de  griis5  'byun  ba ni yul la sogs pa phan tshun bral ba tsam la rag las pa'i phyir ro / 
 1.  P  'thun  pa  2.  P  no).  3.  D  has  /  4.  P  daft  5.  P  de  riid 
  MAV  P55a5-7 D59a5 
  bar yod pa  yan bar dag  to  snan  ba  dan mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnams kyi go 
  skabs yod par 'gyur  te / phrag ni mun pa dan  snail ba'i bdag  riid yin pa'i 
  phyir de dag  dan 'byar bar 'gyur ro / 
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 atoms) is not acknowledged,  [contact) with the different sort  (vzjiitiya) 
of atoms  (paramilvu) of light  (dloka) and darkness (tamas) is necessa-
rily acknowledged since the dividing space (chidra) has both the 
natures of light and darkness  (eiloka-tamo-rapatvilt). This is because it 
is not reasonable that a location which is not reached  (asamariinta) 
by light  (aloka) is devoid of darkness (tamas) or that a location which 
is not covered  (an-iispadi-krta) with darkness is devoid of light . 
 This is why the two [viz., light and darkness] produce an inevitable 
connection (pratibaddha) only at the location, and so forth separated 
 ...no) 
from each other. In the same way, the same error  (dosa) as stated 
immediately above would follow that. 
 If the connection  (sainsparga) with different sorts  (vijatiya) [of  atoms] 
 (m-•• i
s not acknowledged, then the atom in the center (madhyavartin) either 
 [I-2-1  ] faces, by a single nature, one atom and all other atoms in the 
very same way, or  [I-2-2] faces all the other atoms in different ways. 
Thus there are two alternative (vikalpa) ways of dealing with the 
problem. 
(111) MAP  P95b4-8 D93a3 
 de  la dbus na yod pa'i rdul phra rab  gan yin pa de ran  bin  gan gis rdul phra 
 rab gcig la bltas  te gnas pa de  riid kyis  gan la  bltas sam / 'on  te ma yin  2es 
 bya ba brtag pa  griis so / 
 MAK. XI cd MAV P55a8  D59a8-7 
 dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la // bltas pa'i ran  bin  gan yin pa / 
 TS 1989 cd 
 ekakluabhimukhath  riipath yad  akior  madhavarttinab / 
 MAK. XII MAV  P55131 D59a7 
 rdul phran  gan  la  lta ba  yan // de  riid gal  te yin brjod na // de lta yin na 
 de Ita bu // sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram // 
 TS 1990 
 akivantarabhimukhyena ted eva yadi kalpyate / pracayo  bhadharadinam evam 
 sati na yujyate // 
 —  41  —
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 (112... 
 (I-2-1) In the case of the first : 
 (Major:) Whatever has an intrinsic nature which faces the 
     other atom of a single nature  (eka-rapa) would occupy a 
     same spot  (eka-de§a)  (that the surrounding atoms occupy) :
      e. g. the very atom  (in the  center) would occupy the same
      spot that the atom in the front occupies. 
 (Minon) All the surrounding  (parivaraka)  (atoms) have a 
      nature which faces a single atom  (eka-paramanu). 
 (Conclusion  : Therefore, all the surrounding atoms occupy the 
      same  spot.) 
 (This is an inference) formulated on the logical characteristic of 
 -.112) 
essential identity  (svabhava-hetu). The logical reason (hetu) of this 
inference has not the fallacy of inadmissibleness  (asiddhatii), since it 
 (the atom in the center) is acknowledged to face  (another atom) by 
having the very same nature. Neither is this contradictory  (viruddhata), 
since the logical reason (hetu) is present in homogeneous examples 
 (sapaksa). 
 (113••• 
  On the other hand, if  (the surrounding atoms) occupy points different 
(112) MAP  P95b7-8  D93a5-6 
 sbyor  ba ni rdul phra rab kyi  no  bo gcig la bltas pa'i ran  bin  gan yin pa de 
 ni phyogs gcig pa can yin  te / dper na dbus na gnas pa'i rdul phra rab de 
 riid kyi  gar phyogs na gnas pa'i rdul phra rab  lta  bu'am  gar phyogs kyi  khan 
 la  khan pa gcig  bltas pa  lta bu ste / bskor ba'i rdul phra rab thams cad  kyan 
 1.- ...1 
 rdul phra rab gcig la  bltas pa'i ran  biin yin pas  2es bya  ba ni ran  btin gyi 
 gtan tshigs so  // 1. Porn. 
(113) MAP P95b8-96a2  D93a6-7 
 phyogs tha dad pa na gnas pa yin na ni  mnon par 'dod pa'i rdul phra rab 
 gcig  pu la  bltas pa'i ran  bin dag  to mi 'gyur  te / rdul phra rab  te la ran  bgin 
 gian med pa'i phyir ro // ran  bzin med na  bltas pa  yan mi run ba'i phyir 
 gtan tshigs ma  nes pa  riid ma yin no // de'i phyir  yan dag par  na1 bskor  te 
  gnas pa med pas rdul phra rab rnams rgyas par mi 'gyur ro // 1. P  om. 
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from  (bhinna-de.§a) one another, it would be impossible for them to 
face the single atom which is sought. This is because that atom does 
not have a diverse nature  (apardpara-svabha-va). Neither is the logical 
reason (hetu) inconclusive  (anaikdntikatii), since it is not reasonable to 
face one another, if devoid of identity  (svabhdva) . Therefore, the 
surrounding  (parivaraka) atoms would be located at the same point 
 (eka-de.§ata) because [the atom in the  center) is lacking the condition 
 .•113) 
to be surrounded  (parivarydvasthana). When an assemblage (pracaya) 
[of  atoms] does not exist from the standpoint of the highest truth 
(tattvatas), it is not reasonable for the atom  (partimanu) to be acknow-
ledged as having a single nature  (eka-svabhava) simply because of their 
being devoid of the effect  (arthakriya) that is to be proved  (sadhya) . 
 (114— 
 [1-2-2] Then in the second case, since the atom [in the  center) 
separately faces and combines with the other atoms having a different 
nature from one another, it would have portions  (seivayavatii) . Therefore, 
 ••114) i
t is  just evident that atoms are devoid of a single nature (ekatva) . 
This is because the discrimination of an entity (vastu-bheda) is defined 
by its having an intrinsic nature  (svabhcZva-bheda). 
 (115...  j -3] On the other hand ,  [I--3-1) if you maintain the third alternative 
(114) MAK XIII MAV  P55b"  D59a3 
 rdul phran  gian la  lta ba'i  nos // gal  to  ean du  'dod na ni // rab  tu phra' 
 rdul  ji  lta bur // gcig  pu cha  6as med par 'gyur // 1. MAK. P. phra ba'i 
 TS 1991 
 anvantarabhimukhyena  raparh ced anyad  ivate /  katharh  nama bhaved  ekati 
 paramahus  tatha sati  // 
 MAP  P96a2-3  D93a7-93b1 
 phyogs  griis pa  ltar na  yan yan lag dan bcas pa  riid du  thal bar 'gyur bar  gsal 
 bars bdag gis rnam par ma phye'o  //  1. D has rab  tu 
(115) MAV P55a7  D59a5-6 
 bar med pa'i phyogs  kyan 'byar ba'i phyogs  dan tha dad pa med pa  fiid de / 
 —  43  —
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where  Can atom in the  center) is surrounded by atoms without intervals 
remaining between them (nairantarya),  (the nature of the atom in the 
center] is decided by the side which is combined  (santyoga-pak.sa). 
 `Having no interval (nairantarya)' is a synonym of  'combination 
 -115) 
 (sakyoga)'. 
 This is because there is no other alternative (gati) for a thing which 
is devoid of intermediate space  (antarilla-de.§a) except mutual combina-
                  (116) 
tion  (parasparsain.qqa). Even though the same sense is expressed by 
other words (sabda), it does not mean to exist in a different manner 
 (anyatha). This is because otherwise unsuitable consequences would 
follow  (atiprasaitgat). 
 [I-3-2] 
 (Objection:] On the other hand, only that uncombined  (asantyukta) 
                                                           (117)
atom is surrounded by the many stoms which occupy an adjacent location 
        (118) 
 (samipatara-degdvasthita) which should be called the side  (dik-§abda-
vacya). 
 (Answer:] It is not reasonable. This is because this word  ("side") 
is not established in practice  (arthavatta) when this side and that side 
 (arviik-para-blidga) do not exist [in atom]. 
 bar med pa ni phrag med pa'o // phrad pa  daft 'byar  ba  ies bya  ba ni don 
 tha dad pa ma yin  to / 
(116) W  parasparasarhglesamuktvii, V  parasparascoithlesari2  muktvit 
(117) This atomic theory is also a theory of the  Sautrantika. cf. Yuichi Kajiya-
  ma. ibid. Note 5. p. 40. 
 Yuichi Kajima. Sonzai to Chishiki-Bukkyo Tetsugaku Shoha no  Ronso 
    a—v,tv*,:zmorc,"—II. (Existence and Cognition—Debatesof the Budd-
 hist Philosophical Schools) Kyoryobu no Konponteki Tachiba (the Fundamental 
  position of the  Sautrantika school). Journal of Philosophical Studies (Tetsugaku 
  Kenkya *g.4.E) No. 505. (1967), p. 1153. 
(118)  V samipetara 
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 [1-4] 
 (119••  [Obj
ection:) Whatever is determined to have a different nature by 
another thing is false (asat) from the point of reality: e . g. distinctions 
                                       (119a)  ••119)
such as "this side" and "that side"  (piirdparddi-bheda-vat) . According 
to this reasoning,  Can  atom) is not truly endowed with portions  (sliva-
yavatva). 
 [Answer  :] [Your  statement) is incorrect. This is because it is 
impossible for those who admit the external world  (bahir-arthaviidin) to 
 (120•• —120 
confuse this with that due to distinctions of mutual relation  (vyapek.sii-
bheda) : e. g. father and his son. 
  Only the true  (tattvika) should be acknowledged as a nature  (riipa) . 
This is because when it is the further shore  (plira) that depends on 
                                      (121) 
something, it is never the nearer shore (apara) that depends on it [the 
further  shore]. 
  Otherwise, how can the two which are called the nearer and further 
              (122) 
shores  (pardpardbhidhana-tata) exist without the confusion  (asiikkarya) 
                                 (123) 
when both the nearer and further shores are not established from the 
point of view of absolute truth  (aparamarthikatva)  ? 
(119) I cannot identify this source. 
 cf.  MK. XIV-5 
 anyad anyat  pratityanyan  nanyad anyad  rte'  nyatab. / yatpratitya ca yat  tasmat 
 tad anyan nopapadyate // 
 MK.  XVIII-10 
 pratitya yad yad bhavati na hi  tavat tad eva tat / na  canyad api tat  tasman 
 nocchinnarh napi  66vatarli // 
(119a) Read  parapara according to  [VI  CW3 has  pariiviira. 
(120) Read parapara according to  (V).  [W] has  paravara. 
(121) Read  aparam according to  (V).  (W) has  aparam. 
(122) Read  parapara according to  [VI  CITVJ has  pariivara. 
(123) Read  parapara according to  (V].  (VV) has  pariivara. 
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 This is because it is said that the other thing from what is thought 
to be the further shore  (pardbhimata) is none other than the nearer 
  (124)  (125) 
shore  (aparatva) which  [you) want to call  (vivaksita) the nearer shore. 
If it (viz., the further shore) is also thought to be a thing which is 
imagined, the two (viz., the nearer and the further shore) would be 
identical (aikya). And in the same way things which are dependent 
upon something [viz., the nearer  shore]  (tad-d§rita) would not exist 
without confusion  (asathkirna). This is because distinction (bheda) 
which is produced by thought—construction (kalpanoparacito) is not an 
essential component of efficiency  (arthakriyditga). 
 [II) 
 (201-- 
 That thing which is established by itself  (svatah  siddha-rapa) is 
none other than nondual cognition  (advayak  jildnam) which has a 
single nature  (eka-svabhava) and which is separate from the relationship 
pertaining between cognitum and cognizer  (grahya-grahaka-bhava-
rahita) from the standpoint of highest truth (paramdrthatas),  because  : 
1) an object  (visaya) exists by means of perception  (sainvedana), 2) 
(124) Read  aparatvam according to  (V).  (ANT) has  avaratvam. 
(125) Read  aparasya according to  (V).  (W) has  avarasya. 
(201) cf. MAV  P61a7-61b' D64b6-7 
 ran gi sde pa sems tsam gyi tshul la brten pa blo gros dkar  bai  gan dag rnam 
 par  ses pa ni mthun pa'i bag chags  yons su smin pa  la rag las nas ste / 
 byun ma thag  to 'jig pa  daft don du tshor bar bya ba  dan tshor ba po'i rnam 
 pa med do  zes smra ba de dag gi lugs  la dogs pa bsu ste /  I. D pa 
 SantaraWta sums up his view of the Yogacara-school before beginning his 
  refutation of the view of the  Satyakara and  Alikakara-vadins. 
   "I take up the views of Yogacara-school that hold that cognition  (vijiiiina) is 
  produced by the force of the maturation of latent impressions  (viisanii), and 
  these arise in succession. Immediately after being produced, cognition perishes. 
  In truth, [the  Yogaca-ras  maintain] the images  (aara) of the perceived and 
  the perceiver [produced by the force of latent impressions) are non-existent." 
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an object (artha) is entirely invisible  (atyanta-paroksatvat) when it is 
not being perceived, 3) a particular adapted effect is produced  (prati-
niyatasya  karyasyodayat) by means of the immediately preceding moment 
of mind  (samanantara-pratyaya), 4) it is impossible to conceive of 
[the production of a particular adapted  effect] when its (the immediately 
preceding moment of mind) is excluded. 
 This is because if  (nondual  knowledge) were devoid of cause  (ahetu-
katve), it would always exist, etc. 
 Because it is impossible that an eternal thing (nityatva) has efficiency 
 (arthakriya), etc., a thing which perishes as soon as it has been 
produced  (udaydnantarlipavargin) has a connection with its own cause 
(sva-hetu). 
 (202.• 
 Images  (akiira) merely manifest there (viz., in that cognition) by 
means of the maturation of latent impressions which adhere to a thing 
which has been existing as an entity in the world of transmigration 
since the beginningless past  (antidi-bhava-bhavi-bhavabhinivega-viisanii-
                 •202) 
 paripaka-prabhavdt). 
 Therefore, Yogacaras consider that an entity  (bhilva) consists of 
 -201) 
cognition  (filandtmaka). 
 In this case also,  [Yogacaras] discriminate between  (II-1) those 
images  (iikiira) [of  cognition) which are real  (tiittvika);  [II-2) those 
(202) cf. MAK. XLIV. MAV  P61b1  D64b7 
 ji ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi // rnam pa 
 dag ni  snan ba  yan // nor bas sgyu ma'i ran  bin 'dra // 
 MAV P61b3 D65a2 
 dmigs pa bden par 'dod pa'i  ges pa la  snan ba'i rnam pa 'di dag  kyati thogs 
 ma med pa'i srid par  'byutt ba can  duos po  la  moon par  gen pa'i bag chags 
 yons su smin pa'i mthus  snarl  no // 
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which are satisfactory as long as they are not examined by any means 
                                           (203) (203a) 
 (aviciiraika-ramya) such as reflection (pratibimba), etc. 
 (II-1) Let us suppose that those images  (akara) are real. 
 (204•• 
 [II-1-A) In that case, since cognition  (vijneina) is inseparable from 
images  (iikiira) which are real (tattvika) and manifold (aneka), it (viz., 
                                      (204a) 
cognition) would become manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images 
 (akdra-svarapavat), how could it [cognition) be a unity  (ektii)? 
 On the other hand, if cognition  (vzjiicZna) can be defined as having 
a unity (ekatva) since it is perceptible for only one moment (sakrt), 
                 (204b) 
then it is hard to avoid the problem that images  (iikiira) would become 
a unity (ekatva), like the nature of cognition  (vzjiiiina-svarapavat), 
 •••204) 
because they are inseparable from a unitary cognition  (eka-jfitina). 
 [objection:] It is so. 
 [II-1-A-1] 
(203) MAK, XLV. MAV  P61b4  D65a2-3 
 de  dgel 'on  kyan de dag gi3 //2  duos de  yan dag  nid dam  ci  // 'on  te ma brtags 
 gcig  pu na // dga'a bar khas len 'di bsam mo // 1. Reform dge from dag 
 according to MAP  (P107a1, D102b6) 2. D. MAK,  MAY have / 3.  MAV P. has gis 
 MAV  P62a1-2 D65a7 
 'on  kyan 'di la dpyad par bya  can zad tsam 'di yod de / ci rnam pa de dag de 
 kho na  riid yin nam 'on  te ci gzugs  brrian la sogs pa ltar ma brtags pa gcig 
 pu na dga'a ba  iig yin  /1 1. P om. 
(203a)  (IV] pratibimbaka  (V) pratibimba 
(204) MAK, XLVI. MAV  P62a2-3 D65a7-b1 
 gal  te  yan dag rnam par  ges // du mar 'gyur ro  yan na ni  // de dag gcig  'gyur 'gal ldan pas // gdon mi za bar so sor 'gyur  // 
 MAV  P62a3-4  D65b1-2 
 yan dag pa'i rnam pa  dan tha dad pa ma yin pas rnam pa'i ran gi  no bo  Min 
 du rnam par  ses pa du mar 'gyur ba'am  yan na rnam par  ges pa gcig  pu dan 
 tha mi dad pas rnam pa rnams kyan rnam par  ges pa'i ran gi  no bo  Min du 
 gcig  pu  riid du 'gyur  ba bzlog par  dka'ol // 1. P has dka'a 'o 
(204a)  NT) anekaitva  CV] anekatva 
(204b)  (W.)  durniVarairi  (V] durnirvaram 
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 [Answer:] This is incorrect. 
 (205.- 
 This is because if one image  (akara) manifests as a thing which has 
a quality which is unstable, etc.  (calanatvddi-vigista), then the rest of 
the images also would have the very same nature  (tathii-vidhd eva) as 
the former image  (purvadra), because both of them would have an 
undifferentiated  nature  (avyatiricyamdna-marti-svabhavatva). 
 Therefore, it is contradictory that [cognition which has a unitary 
 .-205) 
 nature) perceives a manifold of images  (vaictryakdra). 
 Hence, because it follows that images (a-WI-a), which are not  only 
various  (nandtva) but also particular  (aikantika), are incompatibly 
combined with each other  (paraspara-viruddha-dharmddhydsa-yogiit) 
as both a unitary and a manifold nature (ekdnekatvayoh), then the 
variety  (nandtva) of both images  (akdra) and cognition  (vijii  dna) could 
be proven as a highest truth  (paramc7rthika). 
 Because of this, the acknowledged doctrine of non-duality  (abhyupa-
gat& dvayanaya) would be disproved. 
 (206••  [II -1-A-2) If  [you] think that  [we] never fall into such mistakes as 
(205) MAK. XLVII MAV  P62a5-6  D65b2-3 
 rnam pa tha dad ma yin na //  g•yo  dab mi  g•yo la sogs  lal // gcig  gist thams 
 cad  g•yo  la sogs //  thal bar 'gyur  te  lan3 gdab dka'a // 1.  MAV D. pa 2. P. 
 MAV gi 3. D.  MAV  len 
 MAV  P62a6-7  D65b3-4 
 tha dad pa ma yin  ges bya ba ni de  riid yin no  ges bstan par 'gyur ro // de 
 has na gal  te rnam pa gcig g•yo ba la sogs pa'i byed pa zin tam / ser po la 
 sogs pa'i bdag  riid du gyur na  lhag ma rnams kyan rnam pa de  lta bur 'gyur 
 ro  // de  lta ma yin na gdon mi za bar sna tshogs  riid du 'gyur ro // 
(206)  MAV  P620-6213'  D65b5-6 
 gan bde ba  la sogs pa ltar  snon  po la sogs pa'i rnam pa rnams  kyan  myon 
 ba'i bdag  riid kho na ste /2  6es pa de dag ni man la de dag kyan rigs mthun3 
 pa  ga stag ste / rigs mi mthun pa'i  ges pa  bin du 'byun  no ges smra ba de 
 dag gi  ni  // 1. P om. 2. D om. 3. P has 'thun pa 
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stated above because oneness (eka) is not understood as manifoldness 
(citratva) on the ground that images  (akara) such as the color blue, 
etc., like happiness (sukha), etc. are none other than a thing which 
consists of immediate experience (anubhava), and if  (you) explain that 
diverse cognitions  (vijildna) of the same kind  (samanajatiya) occur 
 -.206) 
simultaneously like different kinds of cognition  (vzjiltiya-jfilinavat), you 
would commit another mistake  (clop). 
 This is because the cognition  (vijficina), which is thought to be 
situated in the center (madhya), is acknowledged to be like an atom 
 (cp) which is surrounded [by other  atoms]. 
 (207.• 
 We can divide it [into two  cases] :  [II-1-A-2-1] Whether, [like an 
atom in the  center), it faces by nature the other  [cognitions] in the 
very same manner that it faces a single (eka) [cognition), or  [II-1-A-
                                                                           -207) 
 2-2j whether it faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner? 
 [II-1-A-2-13 Let us suppose that it faces [by a single nature the 
other  cognitions] in the very same manner [that it faces a single 
 cognition]. Since [the cognition in the  center] is not situated in the 
point where it could be surrounded by the others, it is incorrect that 
others would mutually occupy the different point. 
  Therefore, it would be impossible that a thing which does not exist 
as possessing the directions  (digbhika) of front and back  (pfirviipara), 
etc. manifests in the form of a circle  (manclala) of blue, etc. 
 [II-1-A-2-2] Let us suppose that [it faces other surrounding cogni-
(207) MAV  P63a1-2  D66a4-5   'di  ltar dbus su 'dod pa'i rnam par  ges pa rdul gyis bskor ba  lta bur 'dod pa 
 gati yin pa de'i  ran  bin  gan gis gcig  la  mnon du phyogs pa de  hid kyis ci 
 glan la  yan phyogs sam 'on  to  glan  gyisl phyogs  les rnam par rtog pa'i  ries pa 
  de  hid do / 1. D has gyi 
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tions] in a different manner. 
  How can it [viz.,  cognition] have a single nature  (ekata) since the 
distinction of  a thing (vastubheda) is defined by means of it having 
its own nature  (svabhavabheda)  ? 
 (208.• 
  Therefore, the errors  (dosa) which were found in the case of  exami-
                                                           •208) 
ning an atom  (paramanu) would pertain to this case, also. 
 [II-1-A-2-3] 
 Cbjection:] Cognitions  (jitana) do not have a front part or a back 
part  (paurvaparya) which consists of points (desa) because of their 
immateriality  (amfirtatviit). 
 Therefore, how can cognitions  (jiiiina) be located in the center 
(madhya) in the very same way as atoms  (anuvat)  ? 
 [Answer:) Although your opinion [that cognition is different from an 
atom by nature] is true (satya), it (viz., your statement) contains another 
kind of error (dosa). 
 Cognitions  (jiiiina), since you have admitted that images  ("dkiira) 
manifesting extension  (desa-vitana) are true (satyatva) , would be 
                                                  (209) 
regarded as if they manifested with extension  (dega-vitdna) in as far 
as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do no 
occupy space  (ade§a). Otherwise, even though the appearance of 
manifold cognition  (aneka-jildna) is allowed, a thing which manifests 
by appearing as an extension  (dda-vitana) like  Can  atom) would be 
false  (mithyd). 
(208) MAK. XLIX MAV  P62b7-8  D66a3-4 
 ci' ste rnam pa'i  grans  blin du // rnam par  ges pa khas len na // de tshe 
 rdul phran 'drar2 'gyur ba3 // dpyad pa 'di  la4 bzlog par dka'a  //  1.  MAK.  D  ji 
 2. P. MAV 'dra 3. P. MAV bar 4. MAK. P. D. las 
(209)  (W)  degavitanotpadatt  (V)  degavitandsthanenotpddab. 
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 In this case, allowing the appearance  (utplida) of manifold cognition 
 (aneka-vijiiiina) would be definitely meaningless (vyartha) [if the 
various manifestations of cognitions do not mean their having extension). 
 And the perception of the color blue, etc.  (without extension) being 
different from manifestation  (pratibhasa) of the color blue, etc. which 
has extension  (dega-vitclna) would not be true (satya). 
 And if they (viz., the color blue together with extension) are unreal 
      (210) 
(alikatva), what else would be true  (satya)? 
 Therefore, whatsoever is  this  ? 
 [II-1--A-2-4) 
 (211... 
 [Objection:) Atoms  (alp) have material bodies  (mirta). while 
cognition  (vijfaina) is immaterial  (amarta). 
 In this case (viz., of cognition) how is there the very same error 
 -.211) 
 (dosa) that [the atomic theory)  has  ? 
 [Answer:] There is never an error  (clop)  (if we treat a fault 
concerning atoms as one of  cognition). 
 (212.• 
 This is because the color blue, etc. which manifests as a unity (eka) 
without intervals (nairantarya) is definitely understood as being  compo-
                                         ...212) 
sed of atoms  (parameinv-dtmaka). 
 (213•• 
 Otherwise, a thing which is thought of as the nature of cognition 
(210)  [W] alikatve  [V] alikakatve 
(211) MAP P109b3 D105a3 
 rdul phra rab rnams ni lus can yin la rnam par  6es pa ni lus can  mal yin pa 
 ma yin nam / de ji  ltar na 'dir  ries pa 'di  riid du 'gyur  sham pa la / 1. P om. 
(212) MAV  P63a3-4 D66a6 
 snon  po la sogs pa bar med par  snap  ba de  riid kha cig ni rdul phra rab kyi 
 bdag  riid du khas len / 
(213) MAP  P109b4-6  D105a4-3 
 min tsam tha dad pa 'ba'a  iig  to zed kyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas pa'i mtshan 
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 (sakvid-rfipa) is definitely distinguished as name-only  (nc7ma-matra). 
However, there is no difference between a thing which is characterized 
by continuous extension  (dega-nairantarya) [and an  atom]. A thing 
which exists by virtue of function (pravrtti) as name-only  (nama-matra) 
is not subject to the same error  (tulya-dosatc7) [that an atom  is], but 
that which exists as continuous extension is subject to the same error. 
 Its [continuous  extension) is also an attribute of a thing which is 
distinguished as name-only. 
 Therefore, why shouldn't the same error [as in atomic  theory] be 
 ..213) 
found [in  cognition)  ? 
 (II-1-A-2-5) (Conclusion) 
 (Objection:) Because, even so, the cognition  (jiiiina) and the cogni-
zable  (jneya) are not similar  (vaisadrgya), and refutation  (dasatta) 
pertaining to the cognizable  (jneya) is not admitted for the cognition 
 (Answer:) In this case also, we reply that if multiple cognition 
 (anekajiiiina) occurs at the same time (yugapad), discrimination 
(vikalpa) which is the recognition of an object  (visaya) such as a pot 
or cloth, etc. would not be secondary  (kramabhiivin). 
 (Therefore, discrimination (vikalpa) would come to be produced with 
perception at the same  time.) 
 It is impossible to say that only cognitions, having no thought-const-
ruction  (nirvikalpaka-jitana), occur at the same time (yougapad) since 
 nid kyi don la ni tha dad pa med do //  min tsam  la 'jug pa'i sgos byas pa'i 
 iies pa  mtshuns par  bsgrubi pa ni ma yin gyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas  past 
 byas pa'i  lies pa  mtshuns par byed pa de la  yan  min tha dad pa yod  kyati ji 
 ltar  ries pa  mtshuns par mi 'gyur ies bya ba yin no // 1. P has sgrub 2. P 
 has par 
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    discrimination (vikalpa) is produced by means of a determined immediate 
    experience  (anubhavani§caya). 
     Therefore, these imaginary thoughts  (kalpand) are indeed not produced 
    as something with an unknowable nature  (asakvidita-rfipa) of their 
    own (svayam). 
      So  (if multiple cognition is produced at the same time, as you  say), 
    it would mean that a direct experience (anubhava) is determind imme-
    diately  (sakrt)  (including imaginary  thoughts). Accordingly, it could 
    not be that discrimination (vikalpa) is perceived as a secondary thing 
 (kramabhavin)  (but that this discrimination is simultaneously determined 
    along with  perception). 
      As a result [your  statement] involves a contradiction with respect to 
    direct perception  (pratyaksa-virodha). 
 (This is because direct perception  (pratyaksa) is defined as a 
                                 (214) 




 [Objection:] A single cognition definitely (ekam eva  einam) grasps 
    manifold nature  (citra-rfipa) just as in the case of the manifestation 
 -.215) 
 (pratibhasa) of a jewel which is dark-blue in color  (mecaka-mani). 
 (Answer:) Your statement is incorrect. 
      The reason is as  follows  : 
 (216.- 
      [Major :) Whatever is manifold (citra) is not single (eka) : e. g. 
     (214) NB, I. 4. ibid. Note. 43. 
    (215) MAV  P63a4-5 D66a7 
 gan du nor bu gzi  bin du rnam par  ges pa  gcig  kho nas sna tshogs kyi  no bo 
 blahs so  ies bya de dag gi lugs la dogs pa brjod pa / 
     (216) MAP  P110a3-4  D105131-3 
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notion (pratyaya) in the plural stream of consciousness  (nand-sakttina) . 
 Ninon] This cognition  (vijitiina) is manifold (citra). 
 (Conclusion: This cognition is not  single.] 
 This inference is based on the principle of the perception of incom-
patibility (viruddhopalabdhi). 
 The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible 
(asiddha), since  (cognition] is perceived as a manifold nature (citrava). 
 Neither is this contradictory (viruddha), since it is present in 
 ••216) 
homogeneous examples  (sapak.sa). 
 (II-1--B-2] 
 (Objection:] Why should manifoldness (citra) and unity (ekatva) be 
incompatible (virodha), since manifoldness (citratva) manifests as a 
unity  (ekatva)  ? 
 (217.-  [A
nswer:]  (Your statement is not correct] because there is no other 
 sbyor  ba ni  gan  iig sna tahogs yin pa de ni gcig  pu ma yin  te / dper na  rin 
 po  che rigs sna tshogs pa  lta bu'am / dper na sems  kyi's rgyud sna tshogs  la 
 yod pa'i  ges pa dag  lta bu yin no // rnam par  ks pa 'di  yan sna tshogs  pat 
 yin  te / ran  Mn 'gal  ba dmigs pa yin no // 'di la ji  ltar 'gal ba 'grub  sham 
 pa  la  /  1.  2.  3.  P  om. 
(217) MAP  P110a4-8  D105b3-6 
 ran  bin sna tshogs pa ma gtogs pa  gian sna tshogs pa'i sgrar brjod par bya 
 ba ni med do // sna tshogs pa dan gcig pa  griis  kyan no bo phan tshun rnam 
 par  bcadl pa med na med pa yin pa'i phyir phan tshun spans  te gnas pa'i 
 mtshan  hid kyi 'gal  ba yin pas 'gal ba 'grub2 po / 'gal ba  gnis  kyan ran  bin 
 gcig3 pa  'Aid yin na ni 'gro ba mtha'a dag rdzas gcig  to 'gyur  te / de'i phyir 
 lhan cig skye ba  daft 'jig pa la sogs par thal bar 'gyur  ba bzlog dka'o // de 
 lta ma yin na ni gcig ces  bya  ba  min tsam kho nar 'gyur  te /  min  la ni brtsad 
 pa  med pas gtan tshigs ma  nes pa  Aid ma yin  te / dpe4  rin po  che rigs sna 
 tshogs ni nam mkha'i gos can gyi lugs kyis blta bar bya'i / rnal 'byor spyod 
 pa'i lugs kyis ni ma yin  te / rnal 'byor spyod pa la ni5  rin  po  che ma grub 
 pa'i phyir ro // 1. P gcad 2. D grub 3. P cig 4. D dper na 5. P om. 
 PV. II. 208 
 citrh.-vabhasev  artheu yady  ekatvarh na yujyate / saiva  tavat  katharh buddhir 
 eka  citravabhasini  1/ 
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meaning of the word "manifoldness" (citra) except for "a plural nature" 
 (neinii-svabhilva). Because variation  (nand) and  singless. (ekatva) 
constitute an invariable relation  (neintariyakatva), which are opposites 
by their own nature  (anyonya-svartiipa-vyavaccheda); [thus, these two] 
are contradictory  [terms] (virodha) which are mutually exclusive 
 (paraspara-pariheira-sthiti-laksatta). As a result, incompatibility (viro-
dha) is established [in your statement]. 
 If the two, which are contradictory (viruddha), exist as a single 
nature  (eka-svabhit-vatva), then all the universe  (sakalant  vi,§vam) would 
be a single substance  (ekant dravyam). 
 Therefore, [given such  reasoning) it would be hard to avoid  (durni-
veira) [a  conclusion] that such would mean that [one  thing) has both 
the characteristics of production  (utpilda) and destruction  (vinaga), etc. 
at the same time (saha). 
  Otherwise, the singleness (eka) is none other than name-only  (neima-
matra). Neither is this logical reason (hetu) inconclusive  (anaikdntikatii), 
since there is no dispute  (viveida) with respect to name  (neima). 
 You must not say that, first of all, the manifestation  (pratibheisa) of 
a jewel which has a dark-blue color  (mecaka-matti) is established as 
 -217) 
an example  (dr.stanta). 
 Even in this case, this is because [a thing which consists of a single 
 nature) is incapable of such things as manifesting  (avabheisitva) plural 
nature  (nand-rapa) on the ground that a single nature is not pervaded 
 (avytiptatva) by various natures (niina-rtitpatd) [since these two are 
mutually  exclusive.) 
  Therefore, [that  reasoning) involves the same kind of criticism (tulya-
paryanuyogatva) [that was stated above.] 
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 (II-1-B-3] (Conclusion 1) 
 (Objection:] It is not recognized that by direct perception  (pratyaksa) 
such things as the color blue, which appear before us  (pratibhasamilna), 
are distinguished (bheda) from a thing which exists in another place 
 (dega) and time  (kiila). 
 This is because X is not perceived as different (bhinna) from Y 
because of the absence of the manifestation  (apratibheisana) of two [di-
stinguishable] things  (in direct perception  (pratyaksa) at the same  time). 
 Even if X is not differentiated from Y, since they manifest at the 
same time and place  (samilna-killa-dda), there is such a cognition 
(pratyaya). This is because direct perception  (pratyaksa) can not 
ascertain  (distinction] on account of the absence of thought-construction 
(nirvikalpa). 
 Therefore, a cognition which is both manifold and non-dual at the 
same time (citrddvaya) manifests as a single nature  (eka-rfipa) in 
direct perception  (pratyaksa), since distinction (bheda) between the 
things perceived  (griihya) and between both the perceived and the 
perceiver  (griihya-griihaka) are not mutually perceived. 
 (Answer:]  (Your statement] is refuted as follows : This is because 
unity (eka) is incompatible with manifoldness (citratva). 
 (II-1-B-4) (Conclusion 2) 
 (Objection  :  ] Manifoldness (citra) also is single (eka) since concent-
ration (yoga) and tranquility  (ksema) are not distinguished (abhinna). 
 [Answer:] Your statement is not reasonable (ayukta). This is because 
it is contradictory (virodha) that something (viz., manifoldness) has a 
single nature (ekatva) because of possessing a mutually distinctive 
nature  (vyavrtta-rftpatva). And that concentration (yoga) and tranquility 
 —  57  —
   -**F/GIFFffE%129A 
 (ksema) are not distinguished (abhinna) from each other is not ascertai-
ned by direct perception  (pratyaksa). 
 When the natures of concentration (yoga) and tranquility (ksema) 
are identical (abhinna), some other nature different from its own nature 
 (svariipanyatva) also appears as a simultaneous manifestation  (yugapad-
pratibhasana) [as long as a manifold nature manifests in direct percep-
tion  (pratyaksa) at the same time according to your theory). Therefore, 
why shouldn't manifestation of distinction  (bheda-pratibhiisa)  exist  ? 
  And if you imagine that it is non-dual (advaita), since distinction 
(bheda) is not ascertained (agraha), then X is not distinguished from Y 
as long as there is no distinction (abheda). Therefore, any sort of 
duality (dvaita) is not conceived because this type of characteristic 
 (evak-riipa) is not recognized. If the real entity in its general aspect 
 (vastu-miitra), apart from distinction and non-distinction  (bhedabheda), 
is recognized, how on earth does the manifoldness (citra) of such 
things as the color blue  manifest  ? 
 If the manifestation  (pratibhdsa) of manifoldness (citra) is acknowle-
dged, the very thing would be said to be a manifestation of distinction 
 (bheda-pratibhcZsa) in this world (loka). Therefore, how can distinction 
     (218) - - b
e denied  (bheddpalapa)? (Continued) 
(218)  (W)  bhedapalapah  (V)  bhedapalapah 
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